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INTRODUCTION

This article explores the various categories of individuals who create,
acquire, hold, and dispose of art, and the issues that arise with respect to the
federal income tax consequences to these individuals:
Once a work of art has left the magic world of creation, its
exemption from the laws of commerce is lost. Although it may
seem unfortunate that art and artists do not exist in a creative
vacuum where the mechanics of business cannot intrude, the
reality of the situation, and one the artist cannot afford to ignore,
is that works of art are commercial commodities. Tax
considerations are pervasive in the commerce of art. From initial
sale to final disposition, tax laws touch upon every aspect of the
life of a work of art.'
Because the U.S. has the largest art market in the world, with estimated
sales at $25 billion,2 the U.S. tax treatment of artists and the individuals who
acquire art is of great interest to many in the art market. The taxation of artists
and acquirers of art varies depending on the relationship of the individual with
the art. The extent of productivity and the manner of disposition determines
whether an artist is a hobbyist or in the business of producing art. Tax treatment
of the acquirer, once the art leaves the hands of the artists, is defined by the
manner and purpose for acquiring, holding, and, ultimately, disposing of the art.
Different tax treatment attaches to the acquirer who holds art for pleasure as a
hobbyist, for appreciation as an investor, for resale as an art dealer, or for display
or decoration in a trade or business.
This article defines and distinguishes each category of taxpayer and
provides an examination of the tax provisions that apply to the various
categories. Part I begins with two areas of uncertainty: the definition of art and
the fair market value of art. Part II shifts the focus of the article to the various
categories of individuals who create and acquire art. An artist may create art for
pleasure or for profit. An individual may acquire art for pleasure, for investment,

Jeffrey C. McCarthy, Federal Income Taxation of Fine Art, 2 CARDOZO ARTS
ENT. L.J. 1, 25 (1983).

2

Graham Bowley, Art Sales Grew Last Year, Especially in U.S., Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2014), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/art-salesgrew-last-year-especially-in-u-s-report-says/. The U.S. accounts for 38% of
worldwide sales of art both at auction and in private. Id.

&

1
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for resale, or for business. The purpose of Part II is two-fold: first, the various
categories of individuals are defined and the general tax treatment of the
individuals in each category is explored; and, second, as to each category of artrelated activity, the cases and factors that distinguish between the various
categories, and the complexity and uncertainty in making the distinction, are
examined.
Part III examines specific federal income tax provisions that apply to
certain categories of individuals. It explains the allowance of deductions for
expenses incurred in the business use of the home by artists and art dealers. Part
III then describes the preferential treatment allowed for capital gains and the
limitations placed on capital losses if art is acquired for personal, investment, or
business use. The definition of a capital asset is also explored as it applies to the
various categories of art enthusiasts. This article gives special attention to the
effect that the character of any potential gain has on the amount of the charitable
contribution deduction. Next, this article considers whether art acquired for
investment or business use is depreciable, focusing on the business collector's
undecided treatment of art. Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.")
§ 1033, allowing for nonrecognition of gain on the involuntary conversion of
property, is applied to the involuntary conversion of art. This article also gives
attention to losses, including losses arising from the casualty and theft of
artwork. Finally, the like-kind requirement as it applies to the exchange of art
under I.R.C. § 1031, another nonrecognition provision, is discussed. The struggle
with the many grey areas in the application of federal income tax provisions to
the activities of individuals who occupy the world of art continues throughout
this article.
A.

Definition of Art

One hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, "It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits."3
Thus, as might be expected, neither the I.R.C. nor the Treasury
Regulations contain a decisive definition of art. For the purposes of requesting a

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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Statement of Value 4 from the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") Revenue
Procedure 96-15 defines "art" to include "paintings, sculpture, watercolors,
prints, drawings, ceramics, antique furniture, decorative arts, textiles, carpets,
silver, rare manuscripts, historical memorabilia, and other similar objects."' The
term "collectibles," for the purposes of the preferential tax rate for capital gains 6
includes "any work of art, any rug or antique, any metal or gem, any stamp or
coin, any alcoholic beverage, or any other tangible property specified by the
Secretary." 7 In the opinion of the I.R.S., "[t]he creative process of the artist is
constantly expanding the definition of what is a piece of artwork. The medium
through which an artist works is likewise expanding."8
For estate and gift tax purposes, the I.R.C. defines works of art
transferred to charities as "any tangible personal property with respect to which
there is a copyright under Federal Law." 9 The federal copyright law protects
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,"
including literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and

4

Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627, § 4.01; see infra text accompanying notes
70-75 (discussing Revenue Procedure 96-15, which allows a taxpayer to
request a Statement of Value of art from the I.R.S.).

5

Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627, § 4.01; see infra text accompanying notes
70-75 (discussing Revenue Procedure 96-15, which allows a taxpayer to
request a Statement of Value of art from the I.R.S.).
Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627, § 4.01; see infra text accompanying notes
327-42 (discussing the preferential tax rates for long-term capital gains).

6

7

8

9

I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1), (5)(A), 408(m); see infra text accompanying note 336
(discussing the preferential tax rate for gains realized on the sale or
exchange of collectibles).
Art Galleries-Audit Technique Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERv. ch. 1 (Jan.
2012) [hereinafter Audit Technique Guide], available at http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Art-Galleries-AuditTechnique-Guide#chl.
See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(c)(1)(ii)(b), 25.2522(c)-3(c)(1)(ii) (2011); see also
I.R.C. §§ 2055(e)(4)(B), 2522(c)(3), 2503(g)(2)(A) (2006) (explaining that the
loan of a "qualified work of art," defined as "any archaeological, historic, or
creative tangible personal property," is not a transfer for gift tax purposes);
I.R.C. § 2105(c)(2) (2006) (excluding "works of art," which are imported into
the U.S. solely for exhibition purposes, from the gross estate of nonresident
aliens); Id. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii) (allowing deductions from the
taxable estate of citizens and noncitizens for transfers "for the
encouragement of art").
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choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures,
audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural works. 10 The scope of
copyright protection regarding the definition of protectable art has been the
subject of much "scholarly debate and litigation,"" with the courts having
particular difficulty distinguishing between art and utility. 12 Expressing the
frustration in distinguishing art and utility, one author states, "Thus, the
statuette used as the base of an electric lamp is entitled to copyright protection,
whereas the entirety of an outdoor lighting fixture is not.""
The Tax Court in Simon v. Commissioner14 and Liddle v. Commissioner" also
made the distinction between the sublime and the practical. The issue in both
cases was whether antiques, 19th-century violin bows in the former and a 17thcentury bass viol in the latter, used in the taxpayers' business of being
professional musicians, were subject to an allowance for depreciation. 6 In Simon,

10

Copyright Act § 102(a) (1976). In reaching a legal definition of art for
copyright purposes, the courts have focused on two basic issues: (1)
originality, i.e., the work must be independently created; and (2)
separability, i.e., whether a useful work is applied art (copyrightable) or an
industrial design (patentable). Leonard D. DuBoff, What is Art? Toward a
Legal Definition, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 303, 306-21 (1990).

11

See Thomas D. Seltz et al., § 20:20: Defining Protectable Art, in 3
ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES, (Sept.
2013).

12

Id.

13

Id. (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) and Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

14

Simon v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 247 (1994), aff'd, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
Liddle v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 285 (1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995).

is
16

Simon, 103 T.C. at 265; Liddle, 103 T.C. at 291-92. In Simon, as in Liddle, the
I.R.S. argued that the instruments were "treasured works of art" for which a
useful life could not be determined because the bows had existed for 100
years and had increased in value over that time. In the alternative, the I.R.S.
argued that the bows were depreciable only if the taxpayer could prove that
each bow had a determinable useful life. Simon, 103 T.C. at 258; Liddle, 103
T.C. at 291. To satisfy the "determinable useful life" requirement, the
taxpayers would have to prove a specific or reasonable estimate of the
number of years that the bows would be useful in the taxpayers' business of
being professional musicians. Simon, 103 T.C. at 258. See infra Part III.C.
(analyzing the allowability of depreciation deductions for business art).

74
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the Tax Court distinguished earlier decisions by the court that disallowed a
depreciation deduction for business art because the taxpayers failed to prove that
the assets at issue had determinable useful lives, as the taxpayers did not
establish that the assets suffered substantial wear and tear through their business
use." In Liddle, the Tax Court noted that "[a] work of art is a passive object, such
as a painting, sculpture, or carving, that is displayed for admiration of its
aesthetic qualities." 8 In holding that the instruments were depreciable in both
cases, the Tax Court found that the instruments suffered wear and tear through
their regular, active, and physical use in the taxpayers' trade of being
professional musicians.' 9 In Liddle, the Tax Court stated that the antique viol was
not a "work of art" because the taxpayer used the viol "actively, regularly, and
20
routinely to produce income in his full-time business."
Finally, artist is defined for the purposes of an exemption from the
uniform capitalization rules under I.R.C. § 263A. 2 1 The term "artist" means any
individual whose personal efforts create "a picture, painting, sculpture, statue,
etching, drawing, cartoon, graphic design, or original print edition." 22 The statute
further states that, in determining whether an expense is incurred in the business
of being an artist, the originality and uniqueness of the item created and the
predominance of aesthetic value over utilitarian value of the item created are
taken into account.23 Any expense incurred in producing jewelry, silverware,
pottery, furniture, and other similar household items generally is not considered
as incurred in the business of being an artist.2 4 Thus, an artist's expenses are
exempt from the uniform capitalization rules only if the expenses are incurred to

17

Simon, 103 T.C. at 263-64 (distinguishing Browning (a painting) and Clinger
(antique violins)).

18

Liddle, 103 T.C. at 294.

19

Simon, 103 T.C. at 281; Liddle, 103 T.C. at 297.

20

Liddle, 103 T.C. at 294.

21

The uniform capitalization rules require the capitalization of nearly all
business expenses incurred in the production of tangible property, whether
the property is produced for resale or for use in the taxpayer's trade or
business. PAUL R.

MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

2008).
22

I.R.C. § 263A(h)(3)(C)(i) (2012).

2

Id. § 263A(h)(3)(C)(ii).

24

Act of Nov. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat 3342.

424 (6th ed.
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create an item that is original and unique and has a predominance of aesthetic
value over utilitarian value. 25
Consistently, the definition of art for tax purposes seems to turn upon
the distinction between aesthetic value and utilitarian value. After quoting Oscar
Wilde, "All art is quite useless," 26 a commentator states:
Whether we look at academic debate, or the behavior of museum
curators, hard questions about the nature of art are implicated
by furniture and other beautifully made but functional objects. It
may seem strange that these hard questions should be endowed
by Congress with tax significance, and even stranger that
Congress should come down on the side of Oscar Wilde. 27
Valuation of Art

B.

What is the fair market value of an object that cannot be sold? 28
In 2007, Ileana Sonnabend, a noted art dealer and collector, died at the
age of 92.29 In addition to works of art valued at more than $800 million, her
estate included Robert Rauschenberg's 1959 Canyon, which was on loan to New
York's Metropolitan Museum of Art.3 Canyon is a three dimensional, wall-hung

2

26

27

I.R.C. § 263A(h)(3)(C)(ii); see Lawrence Zelenak, I Can Sit On It, But Is It Art?,
70 TAX NOTES 99-103 (1996).
PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 160 (James Gifford ed.,
McPherson Library 2011).
Zelenak, supra note 25, at 102. Interestingly, the author argues that the
exemption from the uniform capitalization rules contained a gender bias
because fine art is almost the exclusive domain of men while the creativity of
OSCAR WILDE, THE

women is often channeled into utilitarian crafts. See id. at 102-03.
2

Patricia Cohen, Art's Sale Value? Zero. The Tax Bill? $29 Million, N.Y. TIMES:
ART & DESIGN, July 22, 2012, at Al, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/22/arts/design/a-catch-22-of-art-and-taxes-starring-a-stuffedeagle.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

29

Anne-Marie Rhodes, Valuing Art in an Estate: New Concerns, 31 CARDOzo
ARTS

3

& ENT. L.J. 45,46 (2012).

Ultimately, Mrs. Sonnabend was able to retain ownership of the sculpture
only as long as the work continued to be exhibited at a public museum.
Cohen, supra note 28, at Al.
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76

Vol. 43:1

work of art that incorporates an actual preserved and mounted bald eagle.3' As
the sale of a bald eagle, whether dead or alive, constitutes a federal crime
subjecting the buyer to jail and fines under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act,32 Canyon was valued by the estate on its estate tax return at zero dollars
based on three independent appraisals.33 Based on the Art Advisory Panel's34
recommendation, the I.R.S. valued Canyon at $65 million and issued a deficiency
notice claiming $29.2 million in estate taxes and $11.7 million in penalties.35
The Sonnabend case raises many interesting issues in the valuation of
art. For the purposes of valuation for estate tax and charitable contribution
deductions, the Treasury Regulations define fair market value by referencing a
hypothetical sale in the marketplace, the "price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts." 36 The fair market value of property is determined by the price of the

3
32

Rhodes, supra note 29, at 46.
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246
(1962) (amending the 1940 Bald Eagle Protection Act to include golden
eagles). Canyon, one of Rauschenberg's most famous works, was created in
1959 after the passage of the 1940 Bald Eagle Protection Act, which punished
by imprisonment and fines any person who bought, sold, bartered, etc. a
bald eagle; however, the bald eagle on the sculpture was preserved and
mounted before 1940 and found in the trash by a fellow artist and gifted to
Rauschenberg and, therefore, was likely not a violation of the 1940 Bald
Eagle Protection Act. Rhodes, supra note 29, at 49. In 1998, Rauschenberg
provided a notarized statement attesting that the eagle was killed by one of
Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders long before 1940. Cohen, supra note 28, at
Al.

33

Rhodes, supra note 29, at 46.

34

The Art Advisory Panel based its valuation solely on the artistic value of the
sculpture without consideration of any accompanying restrictions or laws.
Cohen, supra note 28, at Al. See Internal Revenue Service, Art Appraisal
Services (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Art-AppraisalServices (describing the function of the Art Advisory Panel).

35

Rhodes, supra note 29, at 46.

3

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (2008), 20.2031-6(a) (1960); see I.R.C. § 2703
(2006) (providing that, for estate and gift tax purposes, property will be
valued without regard to any right or restriction relating to the property, i.e.,
option, agreement, or right to acquire or use the property at a price less than
fair market value, or restriction on the right to sell or use the property).
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property in the market in which the property is most commonly sold to the
public, or, if the taxpayer were in the business of selling the property, the amount
the taxpayer would have received if the property had sold in the taxpayer's usual
market.37 Generally, the primary choices for art valuations are the auction market
and the dealer market.38 For original works by well-established artists, the
auction market is commonly used because of the availability of public sales
records.3 9 Art dealers have no obligation for, and may be contractually prevented
from, releasing sales prices. 0 Interestingly, the I.R.S. may have based its
$65 million valuation of Canyon on a sale in the black market.4 1
Robson v. Commissioner42 addressed the question of whether the illegal
market can be the basis for valuation. In Robson, the issue was the amount of the
charitable contribution by California residents with respect to the donation of
game mounts that could not be legally bought or sold under California law.43
Finding that there was "an active market for substantially comparable items," the
court valued the taxpayer's mounts based on the sale of similar mounts in
neighboring states." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
fair market value is an objective test, stating "there is no requirement that the
taxpayers themselves actually be able to sell the donated goods." 5 The Ninth
Circuit stated further: "In applying this definition, we are required to assume the
existence of a willing buyer and a willing seller, regardless of whether they
actually existed or not, and to assume that the property could and would
exchange hands, even though such a change could not in fact occur."46

Canyon is a different case because the sculpture could not be legally
bought or sold anywhere in the U.S. and could not leave the U.S. or be exported

37

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-l(c)(2), 20.2031-6(a).

3

Rhodes, supra note 29, at 55.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Cohen, supra note 28, at Al.

42

Robson v. Comm'r, 172 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1999).

43

Id. at 876.

4

Id. Replacement cost is used only if the property to be valued is unique, has
a limited market, and there is no evidence of comparable sales. Id.

45

Id.

46

Robson, 172 F.3d at 876 (internal citation omitted).
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for sale.4 7 Of course, the value of the work in Canyon is not zero.48 The value in
Canyon is the fair market value of the sculpture without restrictions, less the
decrease in the value due to the restrictions on its sale.4 9 The Estate of Ileana
Sonnabend was settled, and, as part of the settlement, the I.R.S. accepted the
imposition of no additional estate taxes attributable to Canyon.5o In exchange, the
heirs were required to donate Canyon to a museum for public exhibition and
claim no charitable contribution deduction.5' Canyon was eventually donated to
New York's Museum of Modern Art.52
As illustrated by the problematic valuation of Canyon, the taxpayer, the
appraiser, and the I.R.S. all face unique challenges in the valuation of art.53 The
appraisal and review process is subjective to a large extent, and valuations are
often a reflection of the experience, knowledge, and aesthetic judgment of the
appraiser. 4 But valuations often vary from appraiser to appraiser. 5 Because no
work of art has a direct equivalent, the value of even similar works by the same
artist will differ based on variations in quality, size, subject matter, condition,
provenance, and rarity, making valuation through comparable sales especially

47

See Rhodes, supra note 29, at 55-60, 62 (examining the Treasury Department
and case law precedent for valuation based on an illicit market and policy
reasons why the illicit market should be rejected in this case for valuation
purposes).

8

Id.

49

Id.

50

Sonnabend v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 000649-12, 2012 WL

294629 (T.C. 2013).
51

United States Tax Court, Docket No. 000649-12; Patricia Cohen, MoMA Gains
Treasure that the Met also Coveted, N.Y. TIMES: ART & DESIGN (Nov. 28,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/arts/design/moma-gainstreasure-that-metropolitan-museum-of-art-also-coveted.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0. The heirs donated Canyon to the Museum of Modern Art in New
York City, New York. Id.

52

Id.
Jessica L. Furey, Painting a Dark Picture: The Need for Reform of IRS Practices
and ProceduresRelating to Fine Art Appraisals, 9 CARDOZO

ARTS

& ENT. L.J. 177,

177 (1990).
54

See id. at 181-82; I.R.S. Pub. 561, Determining the Value of Donated Property
(Rev. April 2007) [hereinafter I.R.S. Pub. 561].

55

Furey, supra note 53, at 181-82; I.R.S. Pub. 561, supra note 54.
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challenging.56 Usually, more weight is given to an appraisal by an appraiser
specializing in the kind and price range of the art at issue.57 Disputes with the
I.R.S. are often caused by the volatility of the art market, disagreements as to the
authenticity, provenance of the artwork, taxpayer's title to the art, and any
blockage discount caused by similar items being presented for sale at the same
time.5 In addition, an appraiser may be biased by a personal or business
relationship with the taxpayer or may not be a specialist with experience in the
item or collection being appraised.5 9
Nevertheless, appraisals are the basis for the assessment of tax for
income, estate, and gift tax purposes.60 Typically, the taxpayer prefers the art to
be appraised at its highest value, usually at retail value, to maximize the
charitable contribution deduction for income tax purposes. On the other hand,
the taxpayer prefers the art to be appraised at its lowest value to minimize tax
liability for gift and estate tax purposes. Of course, the I.R.S. prefers a low value
for income tax purposes and a high value for gift and estate tax purposes.61
Because of the difficulties in applying the imprecise "a-willing-buyer-and-awilling-seller" rule to art, and the uniqueness of each art object and the
subjectiveness of its value, taxpayers enjoy significant leeway in establishing the
fair market value of art.62 To temper this freedom, taxpayers are often required to
obtain appraisals. 63

5

William M. Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasersof Art, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 214, 227 (1980).

5

I.R.S. Pub. 561, supra note 54.

5

Alan Breus, Valuing Art for Tax Purposes, J. ACCOUNTANCY (2010), available at

http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2010/Jul/20092096?action.
5

Ted. D. Englebrecht, Valuation of Art for Estate Tax Purposes, CPA J. (2002),
availableat http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0902/features/f09
4002.htm.

60

Furey, supra note 53, at 181-82.

61

Id. at 181.

62

Id. at 184.

63

Appraisals must be submitted with estate tax returns if household and
personal effects have an artistic or intrinsic value of $3,000 or more. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1960). If expert appraisers are employed, the appraisers
must be reputable and of recognized competency to appraise the particular
class of property involved. Id. § 20.2031-6(d). To substantiate the amount of a

AIPLA
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If a tax return selected for audit includes a single piece of art appraised
for $50,000 or more, the I.R.S. will send the art appraisal to the Art Appraisal
Services of the I.R.S. Office of Appeals for independent review and, if necessary,
referral to the Art Advisory Panel.6 The Art Advisory Panel was created in 1968
to assist the I.R.S. in reviewing and evaluating art appraisals submitted by
taxpayers. 65 The Art Advisory Panel is a volunteer board of twenty-five art
dealers, scholars, and curators, who review and appraise works of art involved
in income, gift, and estate tax cases." The Art Advisory Panel meets in
Washington, D.C. once or twice a year in closed-door meetings and reaches a
consensus as to the value of an object of art based on materials provided by the
Art Appraisal Services and its own research. 67 If the valuation of the taxpayer is
rejected, the Art Advisory Panel makes a recommendation as to the value of the
work of art." Although technically the Art Panel's decisions are only advisory,
the I.R.S. district offices consider them binding. The I.R.S. always follows the Art
Panel's recommendation when negotiating with taxpayers.69

64

65

noncash charitable contribution deduction, the donor is required to obtain an
appraisal from a qualified appraiser if the value of the contributed item or
group of items exceeds $5,000. I.R.S. Pub. 561, supra note 54. If the charitable
contribution deduction claimed is $20,000 or more in donated art, a copy of a
signed appraisal must be attached to the tax return along with a photograph
upon request. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(1) (1996); I.R.S. Pub. 561, supra note
54; see Notice 2006-96, 2006-46 I.R.B. 902 (establishing transitional guidance
relating to the new definitions of "qualified appraisal" and "qualified
appraiser" for the purposes of the charitable contribution deduction).
Rhodes, supra note 29, at 64, 65-75 (expressing concerns and offering
recommendations to improve art valuations by Art Appraisal Services).
Id. at 64; see generally I.R.M. 4.48.2.1, Art Advisory Panel (Oct. 10, 2012)
(describing the members, purpose, and function of the Art Advisory Panel).

6

Rhodes, supra note 29, at 64.

67

Id. at 64-65.

6

Id. For example, in 2012, the Art Advisory Panel reviewed 444 items with an
aggregate taxpayer valuation of $281,859,200 on 43 taxpayer cases under
audit. The Art Advisory Panel recommended net adjustments of $66,066,800,
a net 52% reduction on the charitable contribution appraisals and a net 47%
increase on items in estate and gift appraisals. The items of five taxpayers
were not included in the numerical summaries. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE
ART ADVISORY PANEL OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL

SUMMARY REPORT (2012).
69

Furey, supra note 53, at 183.
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Revenue Procedure 96-1570 allows taxpayers to request a Statement of
Value from the I.R.S., which the taxpayer may use to substantiate the value of art
for income, gift, and estate tax purposes. 7' The term "art" includes "paintings,
sculpture, watercolors, prints, drawings, ceramics, antique furniture, decorative
arts, textiles, carpets, silver, rare manuscripts, historical memorabilia, and other
similar items."n A request may be made for art appraised at $50,00013 or more,
and must be submitted prior to filing the return. Revenue Procedure 96-15 lists
items that must be included in the request for a Statement of Value, including the
requirement of a qualified appraisal. 5
In establishing the value of art for income, gift, or estate tax purposes,
the taxpayer and the art appraiser must consider the accuracy-related penalty
under I.R.C. § 6662, which imposes a penalty of 20% of the underpayment
attributable to certain proscribed conduct. 76 "Negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations" 7 and a "substantial understatement of income tax"78 may result in

70

Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1966-1 C.B. 627.

71

Id. § 1.

72

Id. § 4.01.

7

7
7

76

78

Id. § 3.01. The taxpayer must also submit a user fee in the amount of $2,500
for a request of one, two, or three items of art, plus $250 for each additional
item of art for which a Statement of Value is requested. Id. §§ 5.01(2), 7.01(2).
Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1966-1 C.B. 627 §§ 5.01, 7.01.
See id. §§ 5.01, 6, 7.01, 8; see also I.R.S. Pub. 561, supra note 54 (providing
information to donors and appraisers in determining the value of noncash
contributions to charities).
I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006). Interest will accrue on both the underpayment of tax
and the penalty. Id. § 6601(a), (e)(2).
Id. § 6662(b)(1). "Negligence" is defined as any failure to make "any
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title," and
"disregard" is defined to include "careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard." Id. § 6662(c).
Id. § 6662(b)(2). "Substantial understatement of income tax" occurs if the
excess of the tax required to be shown on the return over the actual tax
exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or
$5,000. Id. § 6662(d)(1). The amount of understatement will be reduced to the
extent the taxpayer had substantial authority for the position taken or a
reasonable basis for the position taken and the item is disclosed on the
return. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
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the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty. More specifically, for art
valuation, an accuracy-related penalty may be assessed if the income tax return
contains a "substantial valuation misstatement."7 9 The penalty is increased to
40% of the underpayment for a gross valuation misstatement.so The accuracyrelated penalty also includes "any substantial estate or gift tax valuation
understatement," 8' increasing to a 40% penalty for a gross valuation
misstatement.82
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6664(c), an accuracy-related penalty will not be
imposed if the taxpayer proves a reasonable cause for the underpayment and
that the taxpayer acted in good faith.83 If the valuation overstatement is
attributed to a charitable contribution deduction, the taxpayer must show that
the valuation was based on a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser and the
taxpayer made a good faith investigation into the value." If any part of the
underpayment is due to fraud, the taxpayer is subject to a 75% penalty on the
portion of the underpayment attributable to fraud.85 Finally, I.R.C. § 6695A
imposes a penalty on appraisers whose appraisals result in substantial or gross
valuation misstatements for income, gift, or estate tax purposes.86 Thus, great
79

8

81

Id. § 6662(b)(3). A "substantial valuation misstatement" includes the
reporting on an income tax return of the value or basis of any property at
150% or more of the correct amount of value or basis. Id. § 6662(e)(1)(A). No
penalty is imposed unless the underpayment attributable to the substantial
valuation misstatement exceeds $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of a corporate
taxpayer). Id. § 6662(e)(2).
Id. § 6662(h)(1). A "gross valuation misstatement" includes the reporting on
an income tax return of the value or basis of any property at 200% or more of
the correct amount of value or basis. Id. § 6662(h)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(5). A "substantial estate and gift tax valuation
understatement" occurs if the value of any property claimed on the return is
65% or less of the correct amount of the value. Id. § 6 66 2(g)(1). No penalty is
imposed unless the underpayment attributable to the substantial valuation
misstatement exceeds $5,000. Id. § 6662(g)(2).

83

§ 6662(h)(2)(C).
Id. § 6664(c)(1).

8

Id.

85

Id.

82

8

Id.

§ 6664(c)(3).

§ 6663.
I.R.C. § 6695A(a). The amount of the penalty is the lesser of: (1) the greater of
10% of the underpayment or $1,000, or (2) 125% of the income received by
the appraiser from the preparation of the appraisal. Id. § 6695A(b). The
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care must be given by the taxpayer and the art appraiser in the valuation of art to
avoid substantial penalties.
II.

CLASSIFICATION OF TAXPAYERS

The classification of the individual is the first step in determining the tax
consequences of activities involving art. The artist may create art for personal
pleasure or may be in the business of creating art for profit. Once the art leaves
the hands of the artist, the character of the art is defined by the context in which
it is traded. 7 Art is generally acquired by one of four categories of individuals:
the hobbyist, the investor, the art dealer, or the business collector. The distinction
between the various categories of acquirers of art depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, resulting in a significant amount of
litigation. As to each category, the following first discusses the facts and factors
that distinguishes the four categories of individuals, and second, discusses the
tax consequences to the individuals within each category.
Income Tax Treatment of the Artist

A.

The tax treatment of an artist engaged in a personal pursuit is vastly
different from the tax treatment of an artist engaged in an activity for profit.
Generally, an artist not engaged in the activity for profit (a hobbyist) may not
deduct the expenses incurred in the creative process.88 But if the artist is engaged
in the business of producing art for sale, all ordinary and necessary expenses are
deductible.89 If a profit motive exists, the artist may deduct the expenses incurred
in the business of creating and selling art, such as art supplies, studio rent and
utilities, insurance, traveling expenses, business meals and entertainment,
promotional costs, reference materials, and memberships in museums and

penalty will not be imposed if the appraiser establishes that the appraised
value is more likely than not the proper value. Id. § 6695A(c); see Notice
2006-96, § 2 (stating that, if the claimed value of property based on an
appraisal results in a substantial or gross valuation misstatement under
I.R.C. § 6662, a penalty is imposed on the person who prepared the appraisal
who knew, or reasonably should have known, the appraisal would be used
in connection with a tax return).
87

McCarthy, supra note 1, at 25.

8

Unless specifically provided in the Internal Revenue Code, no deductions
are allowed "for personal, living, or family expenses." I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006).

89

Id.

§ 162(a).
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professional organizations.90 The artist with a profit motive may also take
depreciation deductions for the cost of assets used in the creative process,9' and
loss deductions on the disposition of property. 92
1.

The Artist with a Profit Motive

In 1969, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 183 to deter investment in tax shelters
and provide guidelines for the determination of a profit motive. 93 I.R.C. § 183(c)
defines the term "activity not engaged in for profit" as any activity other than
one to which deductions are allowable under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 212.94 I.R.C. § 162
allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying
on a trade or business. 95 I.R.C. § 212 allows a deduction for all ordinary and

9
91

92

9

94

Id.

Id. §§ 167(a), 168 (2006) (allowing a depreciation deduction for wasting
assets used in a trade or business or held for the production of income).
Id. § 165(c)(1) (2006). An individual may deduct a loss on the disposition of
personal use assets only if the loss is the result of a casualty or theft. Id.
§ 165(c)(3).
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1 (1969), § 213(a). I.R.C. § 183 applies to individuals,
S corporations, estates, and trusts. I.R.C. § 183(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.1831(a), (f) (1972). I.R.C. § 183 has also been extended to partnership activities.
Rev. Rul. 77-320, 1977-2 C.B. 78; see Donald P. Samelson & Paul G.
Schloemer, Choosing the Best Form of Entity for Hobby Activities, TAXES: THE
TAX MAG., 21-26 (2011) (examining the choice of entity in situations where a
group of taxpayers collaborate in an activity not engaged in for profit).
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2. For example, deductions are not allowed for activities
that are carried on primarily as a sport or hobby, or for recreation. Id.
§ 1.183-2(a). In 2005, 1.5 million taxpayers, many with significant income
from other sources of $100,000 or more, filed a form 1040 Schedule C (Profit
and Loss from Business) showing no profits, only losses, for the four
consecutive tax years. By claiming the losses, approximately 1.2 million of
the 1.5 million taxpayers avoided paying $2.8 billion in taxes for 2005.
Seventy-five percent of the taxpayers were assisted by tax practitioners.
Internal Revenue Service, I.R.C. § 183: Activities Not Engaged in for Profit,
AuDrr TECHNIQUE GUIDE (2009).

9

I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006). The Supreme Court defined the term "necessary" as
payments that are "appropriate and helpful" for the development of the
taxpayer's business and "ordinary" as payments that, although not habitual
or normal in the business of the taxpayer, are common and accepted in the
business community that the taxpayer is part. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
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necessary expenses incurred in the production of income and for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production
of income.96 I.R.C. § 183 is pivotal in distinguishing whether an artist is creating
art for pleasure or business and whether an art collector is collecting art for
pleasure or investment.9 7
To provide guidance, the Treasury Regulations list and describe nine
relevant factors to consider and weigh in determining whether an activity is
engaged in for profit.98 The relevant factors are: (1) the manner in which the
taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
advisors; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the
activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate; (5) the
success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the
taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount
of occasional profits, if any; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) the
elements of personal pleasure or recreation. 99 The Treasury Regulations state that
no single factor is determinative, nor are the nine listed factors the only factors to
be considered.100 Finally, even if the taxpayer's expectation of a profit is
unreasonable, a profit motive may exist if the facts and circumstances indicate

96

9

111, 113 (1933). "The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is
rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle." Id. at 115.
I.R.C. § 212(1), (2) (2006). In addition, I.R.C. § 212 allows a deduction for
expenses incurred in connection with the determination, collection, or
refund of any tax. Id. § 212(3).
See infra Part II.B.1. (distinguishing the art collector with a profit motive
from the art collector without a profit motive).

98
9

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
Id. The Treasury Regulations also provide examples to illustrate application
of the factors. Id. § 1.183-2(c).

100 Id.

§ 1.183-2(b). No single factor controls and other factors may be

considered, and the fact that the number of factors indicating the lack of a
profit motive exceed the number of factors indicating the presence of a profit
objective, or vice versa, is not conclusive. Dreicer v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 642, 645
(1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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that the taxpayer entered or continued the activity with a bona fide expectation
of making a profit.o'
The Treasury Regulations and the courts often look to the dominant
purpose of the taxpayer in the weighing process,102 giving greater weight to
objective facts than the taxpayer's statement of intent. 0 I.R.C. § 183 contains a
rebuttable presumption that the taxpayer's activity is for profit if the activity was
profitable for three of the five preceding years.10 As deductions are denied for
expenses incurred in an activity carried on primarily as a hobby or for
recreation, 0 5 the artist has the burden of presenting facts and circumstances that
establish an actual and honest objective of realizing a profit. 106 For example, the
artist must conduct the creative process and sales activity in a business-like
manner, maintain accurate and complete books and records, establish
relationships with galleries and experts in the art business, expend substantial
time and effort in creating and selling art; and provide a business plan, profit
projections, and method of operation. The determination of motive takes into
account all of the facts and circumstances with regard to the activity, making the
question of motive a factual determination and not a legal one. 07
Fortunately, for hobbyists, I.R.C. § 183 allows the artist to deduct
expenses, to a limited extent, even though the activity is not engaged in for

101 Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a). A small chance of making a large profit may be

302

sufficient to indicate a profit objective, e.g., an investor in a wildcat oil well.
Id. §1.183-2(a).
See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME
483 (10th ed. 2012). But see Faulconer v. Comm'r, 748 F.2d 890, 895-96 n.10
(failing to decide whether the taxpayer must have a "primary" or

"predominant" purpose of making a profit under I.R.C. § 183).
103
104

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a); Dreicer, 78 T.C. at 645.
I.R.C. § 183(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(1)(ii). If the taxpayer does not satisfy
the presumption, no inference arises that the activity is not engaged in for
profit. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(1)(ii). The taxpayer may elect to postpone the
determination as to whether the presumption applies until the close of the
fourth year. I.R.C. § 183(e).

§ 1.183-2(a).

105

Treas. Reg.

106

Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).

107

Calvin H. Johnston, Horse Losses and Other Pleasures, 142 TAX
1446 (2014).

NOTES

1443,
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profit.'as Generally, the expenditures incurred in creating paintings, sculptures,
and other works of art for pleasure are deductible to the extent of the income
generated by the artistic activity. 09 Of course, the artist may deduct expenses that
would have been deductible regardless of a profit motive, e.g., real property
10
If the gross income
taxes, qualified residence interest, and casualty losses.o
derived from the activity for the taxable year"n exceeds the otherwise allowable
deductions, the artist may deduct expenses that require a profit motive to the
extent of any excess.112
Example: Taxpayer is an architect who earns $500,000 a year
performing architectural services. Taxpayer also paints
landscapes. During the current tax year, Taxpayer painted seven
landscapes, selling five for $2,000 each for a total of $10,000, and
incurred total expenses of $15,000 as follows: $4,000 rent for
studio space; $6,000 cost of art lessons, supplies, and materials;
and $5,000 travel, meal, and lodging expenses. In past years,
Taxpayer did not generate a profit as an artist. Assuming
Taxpayer's artistic activity is determined as not engaged in for
profit and Taxpayer has no otherwise allowable deductions,
Taxpayer's deductions are limited to the $10,000 income
generated by the sales of the paintings.
The direct costs incurred in the creation of art are nondeductible capital
expenditures that establish the basis in the artistic work." 3 If an artist is a
hobbyist, the artist's basis is the cost of the materials used to create the art, for
example, canvas, paint, and framing.11 4 But if the taxpayer produces tangible

1os

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a).

I-

1.R.C.

110

Id.

11

112

113
"1

§ 183(b).

The gross income includes total gains from the sale or exchange or other
disposition of property and all other gross receipts derived from the activity.
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(e).
I.R.C. § 183(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b)(1). I.R.C. section 183 does not provide
for the carryover of any unused deductions. I.R.C. § 183(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.183-1(b)(1). The Treasury Regulations prioritize the deductions allowed
to the extent of excess income. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b).
I.R.C. § 263(a), Treas. Reg. §1.263(a)-2T(d).
I.R.C. § 1012 (2006).
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personal property for resale, the taxpayer must capitalize all direct and indirect
costs under I.R.C. § 263A."5 Fortunately, I.R.C. § 263A(h) allows an exemption
for freelance authors, photographers, and artists. Thus, if an artist is creating art
for resale, the artist is allowed a current deduction for otherwise deductible
expenses incurred in connection with the creation of artistic works.1 16 The
rationale for the exemption was to provide relief to artists from the
administrative complexities resulting from the application of the uniform
capitalization rules. 1 7 Thus, if an artist is in the business of creating artistic works
for profit, the artist may deduct all of the costs incurred in the creative process,
resulting in a zero basis in the art.

2.

Distinguishing the Hobbyist from the Artist with a
Profit Motive

Distinguishing an artist who is creating art for pleasure from an artist
who is creating art for profit is often a difficult factual determination. In Stasewich
v. Commissioner,118 the Tax Court applied the factors set forth in the Treasury
Regulations"1 9 to determine whether the taxpayer's artistic activity was "engaged

n5 Id. § 263A(a), (b). Generally, inventory, real and tangible personal property
produced by the taxpayer, and real and personal property acquired by the
taxpayer for resale are subject to uniform capitalization rules. Id. "Tangible
personal property" includes film, sound recording, video, book, or similar
property. Id. § 263A(b). For producers, "indirect costs" are defined as all
costs other than direct material costs and direct labor costs, and, for resellers,
"indirect costs" are defined as all costs other than acquisition costs. Treas.
Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(2)(i), (ii). Personal use assets are exempt from the uniform
capitalization rules. I.R.C. § 263A(c)(1).
116
Id. § 263A(h); McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 21, at 422-23. The exemption does
not apply to expenses paid by an employee, other than employee-owner of
an employee-owned corporation, or that is related to printing, photographic
plates, motion picture films, video tapes, or similar items. I.R.C. §
263A(h)(2). Prior to the adoption of I.R.C. § 263(h), Notice 88-66 provided a
safe harbor for the deduction over a 3-year period of qualified creative costs
incurred by authors, photographers, and artists. Act of Nov. 10, 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-647, 102 Stat 3342; I.R.S. Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548.
117

I.R.S. Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548.

118

Stasewich v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, *7 (1996).

119

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b). See supra text accompanying notes 98-107
(discussing the factors listed in the Treasury Regulations to be considered in
determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit under I.R.C. § 183).
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in for profit" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 183(c).1 20 The taxpayer majored in art
and minored in accounting while attending a university and ultimately began his
own accounting business as a sole practitioner. 121 At the same time, the taxpayer
began developing himself as an artist. 1 2 2 For the four tax years at issue, 1988
through 1991, the taxpayer's artistic activity incurred annual losses, with a total
loss of $89,827.123 The Tax Court noted that the mere fact a taxpayer derives
personal pleasure from an activity does not mean that the taxpayer lacks a profit
motive, because a taxpayer is not required to dislike an activity before it is
considered a business and not a hobby.1 24 But the fact that a taxpayer has
substantial income from other sources may indicate that the taxpayer is not
engaged in the activity for profit, especially if personal or recreational elements
are involved. 25
In Stasewich, the Tax Court focused on whether the taxpayer maintained
complete and adequate books and records, and carried on the activity in a
business-like manner as indicators of a profit motive.1 26 The taxpayer's business
records consisted of a cash and receipts journal and a cash disbursement journal,
which did not reconcile with a shoebox full of receipts and credit card
statements.1 27 Additionally, he did not keep records to monitor expenses, assess
profitability, maintain a budget, or make financial projections.1 28 The taxpayer's
failure to implement any operating changes after continued losses also indicated
the lack of an intention to derive a profit from his artistic activity. 12 9 In addition
to denying the taxpayer's deductions for lacking the requisite profit objective, the

120

Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at **3-5.

121

Id. at *4.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Treas. Reg.

125
126

§ 1.183-2(b)(8); Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at **11-12.
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b); Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at **11-12.
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(1); Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at *9.

127

Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at *9.

128

Id. at *10.

12

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(1); Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at *11. The Tax Court
stated, "[tihe large unabated expenditures, the absence even at this late date
of any concrete business plans to reverse the losses, and the manner in
which petitioner conducted his artist activity lead to the conclusion that this
was not an activity engaged in for profit." Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at *11.
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Tax Court sustained the imposition of an accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. §
6662(a). 1o
In a case five years later involving the same taxpayer,131 the Tax Court
again determined whether the taxpayer's artistic activity was "engaged in for
profit" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 183(c).13 2 For the four tax years at issue,
1992 through 1995, the taxpayer experienced annual losses with regard to his
artistic activity, with a total loss of $74,499.133 In this case, the Tax Court found
that the taxpayer provided adequate substantiation for his expenses: a
spreadsheet of income and expenses, a cash receipts journal, and receipts for his
expenses.'3 The taxpayer also completed the necessary state and federal business
and tax requirements to engage in the business of selling art. 35 At one point, the
taxpayer even changed from drawing nudes to drawing fashion illustrations and
then portraitures and installing art displays to create a commercially viable
product.136
Holding that the artistic activity of the taxpayer did not demonstrate the
requisite profit objective, the Tax Court stated that although the taxpayer's
artistic activity had "some of 'the trappings of a business,' such 'trappings' are
insufficient to demonstrate that the activity was a business." 3 7 The taxpayer
failed to prove that the books and records were kept for the purposes of cutting
expenses, increasing profits, and evaluating overall performance.13 8 The taxpayer
did not maintain a budget or make financial projections.1 39 The continued losses
sustained by the taxpayer and the extent of the losses as compared to the profits
40
indicated that his artistic activity was carried on for purely personal reasons.1

1"0 Stasewich, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at *18; I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2012) (imposing an
addition to tax equal to 20% of the underpayment).
131

Stasewich v. C.I.R., (Stasewich II) 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (T.C. 2001).

132

Id. at *1.

"33

Id.

134

Id.

13s

Id.

13

Stasewich II, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) at *2.

137

Id. at *3.

138

Id.

139

Id.

"4

Id. at *4.
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Because of the taxpayer's training and experience in accounting, the Tax Court
again sustained the imposition of an accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C.
§ 6662(a):141
Petitioner has demonstrated a change in the type of artwork he
creates, but he has not presented evidence of a change in his
operating methods that would allow him to generate a profit
from his artist activities. Petitioner has not reversed his
uninterrupted history of losses, and such losses tend to indicate
that he was content to sustain those losses for purely personal
reasons.1 42
In Churchman v. Commissioner,'43 the taxpayer was involved in artistic
activities for twenty years.'" The taxpayer mainly painted but also sculpted,
designed, drew, and built; wrote short stories, poems, and songs; and performed
in films and created a film.1 4 5 After attaining an undergraduate degree, the
taxpayer attended art school for several years.1 46 The taxpayer had no other
employment and devoted a substantial amount of time to artistic activities:
taught art classes at the college level and numerous workshops, designed and
ran an art gallery for one year where her own work was shown, exhibited
paintings and sculptures at commercial galleries at least once a year, opened her
home studio to the public at least once a year, won first prize at an art show for
one of her sculptures, was written about in numerous articles, visited galleries in
San Francisco and New York attempting to have her work shown, and
maintained a mailing list of approximately 200 names to whom she sent
announcements of her shows.147 Although she was able to sell some of her art,
the taxpayer began producing posters and books in order to make her art more
profitable.4 8 The taxpayer also kept a record of sales and expenses. 149 But in the

141

Stasewich II, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) at *5.

m

Id. at *4.

143
4

Churchman v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 696 (1977).
Id. at *697.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id. at *698.

148

Churchman, 68 T.C. at *698.

149

Id. at *699.
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twenty years of her artistic activities, the income from the sale of her artwork
never exceeded her expenses.''o

'

In reviewing the record as a whole, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer
had a bona fide intention to derive a profit from her artistic activities within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 183(c).1s' The Tax Court noted that certain factors indicated
an absence of a profit motive, such as her history of losses, lack of financial
dependence, and significant recreational elements.152 Nevertheless, from the
taxpayer's testimony and the objective evidence, the Tax Court concluded that
she was a dedicated artist, craved personal recognition as an artist, and believed
that selling her art at a profit represented attainment of recognition as an artist.' 5
[A] history of losses is less persuasive in the art field than it
might be in other fields because the archetypal 'struggling artist'
must first achieve public acclaim before her serious work will
command a price sufficient to provide her with a profit. The
other factors indicating an absence of profit motive are
persuasive but they are outweighed by the facts demonstrating
that petitioner did engage in her artwork for profit.'
In a recent decision, Crile v. Commissioner,155 the Tax Court determined
whether a career artist, who was also a tenured art professor, had a profit motive
with respect to her art under I.R.C. § 183 and was engaged in the business of
being an artist within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162.156 The taxpayer had a long and
distinguished career as an artist: she worked more than forty years in media
including oil, acrylic, charcoal, pastels, printmaking, lithograph, woodcut, and
silkscreen; she created more than 2,000 works of art; she received numerous
professional accolades, residencies, and fellowships; and her artwork was
purchased by both for-profit and non-profit entities, exhibited through leading
galleries, and acquired for the permanent collections of at least twenty-five

150

Id.

1s'

Id. at * 701.

152

Id.

1s3

Churchman, 68 T.C. at *702.

15

Id. at *701-02.

155

Crile v. Comm'r, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 372 (2014).

15

Crile v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2014-202, *28, *52 (2014).
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museums.15 7 Even though she was a full-time tenured professor of art at a
college, the taxpayer devoted thirty hours per week during the academic year,
and worked full time during the summer on her art business."5 During the tax
years at issue, the taxpayer worked on five main art projects, had gallery
representation, marketed her artwork through mailings and online, and kept
generally accurate books and record. 59 At trial, several experts testified on the
various facets of the art world, including the fluctuating nature of an artist's
income, the importance of gallery representation, and the taxpayer's businesslike
and professional treatment of her artwork.160 From 1971 to 2013, the taxpayer
generated gross proceeds of nearly $1.2 million and net proceeds of $668,000 but
never reported a net profit from her art business.161 The taxpayer earned between
$86,000 and $106,000 from her teaching position during the tax years at issue.1 62
In Crile, the Tax Court first held that the taxpayer's activities as an artist
and art professor were two separate activities.1 63 The Tax Court based its decision
on the facts that the taxpayer was producing art 10 years before she began
teaching and 25 years before she became a tenured full professor, and that she
was not required to market her art to retain her teaching profession.'6 Next, the
Tax Court held that the taxpayer conducted her activity for profit, applying the
nine factors listed in the Treasury Regulations for the purposes of determining
the dominant intent of the taxpayer under I.R.C. § 183.165 After discussing the
facts and the law applicable to each factor, the Tax Court found that the first four
factors (manner in which the activity was conducted, expertise -of the taxpayer
5

See Crile, 108 T.C.M. at *3-5.

158

See id. at *3, *37.

159

See id. at *9, *11, *30-31.

16o

See id. at *15-19.

161

See id. at *13.

162

See Crile v. Comm'r, 108 T.C.M. at *14.

163

See id. at *26. The Secretary of the Treasury argued that the taxpayer's art
business and teaching position were a single activity, and, as such, her artrelated expenses were unreimbursed employee deductions subject to the
floor created by I.R.C. § 67(a). See infra text accompanying notes 221-24
(explaining the floor to which miscellaneous itemized deductions are
subject).

'6
165

See Crile, 108 T.C.M. at *26-27.
See id. at *28; supra text accompanying notes 98-107 (discussing the
application of the nine factors listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)).

94

AIPLA

Q.J.

Vol. 43:1

and her advisors, time and effort expended, and expectation of appreciation in
value) strongly supported the conclusion that the taxpayer engaged in her art
activity with an actual and honest expectation of making a profit.16 The Tax
Court determined that the fifth, eighth, and ninth factors (success in other
activities, financial status, and elements of personal pleasure, respectively)
slightly favored the taxpayer or were neutral.1 67 Only the sixth and seventh
factors (history of income or losses, and amount of occasional profits,
respectively), in the opinion of the Tax Court, favored the Secretary of the
Treasury but not as strong as in many other I.R.C. § 183 cases.1 68 The court
concluded:
In the qualitative as well as a quantitative sense, we conclude
that the balance of factors favors petitioner and that she has met
her burden of proving that in carrying on her activity as an
artist, she had an actual and honest objective of making a profit.
We therefore hold that she was, within the meaning of section
162(a), engaged during the years in issue in the "trade or
business" of being an artist.169
The Tax Court, in Crile, took a mechanical approach in applying and weighing
the nine factors listed in the Treasury Regulations in concluding that the
dominant motive of the taxpayer in producing art was to make a profit.17 0
B.

Income Tax Treatment of the Art Collectorwho is a Hobbyist

A taxpayer may collect art as a hobbyist.171 A hobbyist acquires art not
for the purpose of making a profit on resale but primarily for the enjoyment of

'6
167
168
169
170

§ 1.183-2(b)(1)-(4).
See Crile, 108 T.C.M. at *43, *49-52; Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(5), (8), (9).
See Crile, 108 T.C.M. at *29-42, *52; Treas. Reg.

See Crile, 108 T.C.M. at *43-49, *52; Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(6), (7).
Crile, 108 T.C.M. at *52.
See id.; Waitzkin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1992-216, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2740
(1992) (holding that, despite independent sources of income, an artist was
engaged in art activities for profit and, therefore, allowed I.R.C. § 162
deductions for business expenses); see also Hughes v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo
1995-202, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2562 (1995) (holding that the artist was engaged
in art activities for profit and, therefore, allowed I.R.C. § 162 deductions for
business expenses but not personal expenses incurred).

Taxation of Artists & the Acquirers of Art

2015

95

ownership.1 72 As with the artist who creates art for personal pleasure, the
collector who is a hobbyist may not deduct expenses incurred in the acquisition
and maintenance of art.173 Nevertheless, the art collector who is a hobbyist may
deduct expenses incurred to the extent of income generated by the artistic
activity under I.R.C. § 183.174
Although gain on the sale of art is included in income,1 75 the art collector
may not deduct a loss on the sale of art held without a profit motive.1 76 Loss
deductions are allowable only if incurred in a business or a transaction entered
into for profit.'77 Whether the hobbyist is an artist or an art collector, the loss on
the sale of art is a nondeductible loss. 78 Nevertheless, a hobbyist is allowed a loss
deduction with regard to works of art if the loss is the result of a "fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft."1 79 On the destruction or theft of art,
the amount of the h6bbyist's loss deduction is the lesser of the reduction in value
of the art or the cost of the art.'so
On the disposition or charitable contribution of art, tax treatment differs
greatly between an artist who is a hobbyist and an art collector who is a

171

Richard M. Horwood, Key Issues for Collectors: Income, Gift, and Estate Tax
Planning,31 J. TAX'N INV. 3 (2013).

172

Id. at 3-5.

173

I.R.C. §§ 262(a), 183(a).

174

See supra text accompanying notes 98-112 (providing a detailed examination
of I.R.C.

175

§ 183).

I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2012). Gained from dealings in property is the amount
realized on the disposition of property minus the basis in the property. Id. §
1001(a) (2012). This tax-free recovery of investment is one of the basic
premises of federal income tax law. BORIS 1. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON,
JR., & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS

¶

31.02 (3d ed. 2002).
176

I.R.C. § 165(c). Loss from dealings in property is the basis in the property
minus the amount realized on the disposition of the property. Id. § 1001(a).

177

Id. § 165(c)(1)-(2).

178

Id. § 183(a).

17

180

Id. § 165(c)(3). See infra text accompanying notes 488-528 (examining the
treatment of casualty and theft losses).
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (2012). The fair market value of property after a theft
is zero. Id. § 1.165-8(c) (2012).
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hobbyist.'S' The gain or loss on the disposition of art by the artist who is a
hobbyist is ordinary income because the artist is the creator of the art; therefore,
the art is a noncapital asset.182 Conversely, the gain or loss on the disposition of
art by an art collector who is a hobbyist or an art collector who has a profit
motive is capital gain because the art is a capital asset.' 83 If the art is held for
more than one year, the gain is long-term capital gain, which is subject to a
preferential rate of tax.184
If a charitable contribution is made, whether the art is characterized as a
capital asset also affects the amount of any charitable contribution deduction.
The amount of the charitable contribution made by an art collector who is a
hobbyist or an art collector who has a profit motive is the value of the donated
art if the character of the gain upon sale would have been long-term capital
gain.' 85 Because the character of the gain upon sale by the artist who is a hobbyist
would have been ordinary income, the amount of the artist's charitable
contribution deduction is limited to the artist's basis in the art, namely, the cost
of materials. 86
Distinguishing a collector who is acquiring art for pleasure from a
collector who is acquiring art for profit is as difficult as determining the
dominant motive of an artist. In Stanley v. Commissioner,187 the taxpayer collected

181
182

183

Horwood, supra note 171, at 3-5.

I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(A). The art is also a noncapital asset of the taxpayer in
whose hands the basis of the art is determined by reference to the basis of
the art in the hands of the creator, e.g., a donee. Id. § 1221(a)(3)(C).
Id. § 1221(a); see infra Part III.B. (discussing the characterization of gains and
losses on the disposition of art).

1- I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222(a)(3); see infra text accompanying notes 327-42
(discussing the preferential tax rates applicable to long-term capital gain).
185
186

187

I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (2012).
l.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). If the gain on the sale of the art would have produced
short-term capital gain, the amount of the charitable contribution deduction
is also limited to the basis. Id. The gain upon the sale of art by an artist who
has a profit motive is also ordinary; therefore, the amount of the artist's
charitable contribution deduction is limited to the artist's basis in the art.
I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), (3), 170(e)1)(A). See infra text accompanying notes 380-89
(determining the amount of a charitable contribution deduction).
See Stanley v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 516, No. 11448-78, 1980 WL 4063, *1
(1980).
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antique glass novelties and marbles, locating the items through notices to antique
dealers and visits to antique shows and shops throughout the U.S.ss After
gaining expertise, the taxpayer wrote a book about her collection of glass
novelties, entitled "A Century of Glass Toys," and she published numerous
articles in national antique trade journals about her collections.18 9 Although she
kept records of her glass novelties acquisitions and her book sales, the taxpayer
did not keep records with respect to the expenses of her glass-novelties activities
or have a separate checking account for the proceeds from her glass novelties
and book sales.'1' Much of the taxpayer's home was dedicated to her various
collections.1 91 The taxpayer experienced substantial annual losses from her
activities with regard to her glass novelties collection.1 92 In finding that the
taxpayer did not have the profit motive as required by I.R.C. § 183,193 the Tax
Court stated:
The mere fact that a collector is aware that the value of his
collection may increase does not mean she is primarily
motivated by an expectation of profit rather than the personal
satisfaction derived from pursuing a hobby and a hobby is not
hereby converted in to an activity engaged in for profit.1 94
Similarly, in Dailey v. Commissioner, 195 the taxpayers were denied
deductions for travel expenses incurred in visiting museums, including a trip to
Europe, because the taxpayers did not prove that the expenses were incurred for
the production of income as required by I.R.C. § 212(a).1 96 The taxpayers used
their acquired expertise to purchase a substantial number of art objects and
antiques over a period of thirty years.1 97 Although some of the antiques were

'8

See id. at *1, *3.

189

See id. at *3.

190

See id. at *4.

191

See id.

192

See Stanley, 1980 WL 4063 at *5, *7.

193

See id. at *8.

194

See id. at *7.

195

See Dailey v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1352, T.M.C. (P-H) P 80, 59, 1982 WL
10881, *1 (1982).

196

See id. at *1.

197

Id.
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displayed in their home, the bulk of the antiques were kept in boxes in vacant
rooms of the home. 98 Over the thirty-year period, the taxpayers never advertised
nor sold any of the art objects or antiques.'" The taxpayers kept receipts of
purchases but did not make a comprehensive inventory until preparation for
trial.200 The taxpayers collected the art objects and antiques, in part, for personal
reasons. 201 But an important factor was the desire to purchase items that would
substantially appreciate in value, providing a "nest egg" for retirement or if Mr.
Dailey predeceased Mrs. Dailey.202 Nevertheless, the Tax Court denied the
deductions stating:
Petitioners had a floating and perhaps personally important
expectation that their cultural interest in art and antiques would
ultimately prove profitable, as well as personally enjoyable.
Again, so does the philatelist or numismatist, but this does not
make deductions for a European trip (or the other expenses
before us) deductible.2 03
As the determination of motive requires, an examination of a unique set
of facts, the facts of each case and the holding of each court, provides greater
insight as to the facts and factors that distinguish collectors with and without a
profit motive. In Wrightsman v. United States,204 the U.S. Court of Claims set a
high bar for meeting the requisite profit motive.2 05 In holding that the expenses
incurred with respect to the taxpayers' art collection were not deductible under
I.R.C. § 212, the analysis of the Court of Claims demonstrates the factual nature
of the inquiry as to the intent of the taxpayer.206 The Court of Claims found that
the requirement of physical segregation of the art held for investment from the

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Dailey, 1982 WL 10881, at *1.

201

Id.

202

Id.

20

Id.

24
205

Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
Sarah M. Johnson, Art is long, Life is Short: Estate Planningfor the Artist and the
Art Collector, ABA SEcTION OF TAXATION (Jan. 25, 2013).

206

Wrightsman, 428 F.2d at 1317.
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art held for personal pleasure was not supported by case law,2 07 and that the
personal. use of the art collection and the personal pleasure derived from the art
collection did not preclude the finding of investment intent.208 Although the
detailed facts provided by the taxpayers were consistent with an investment
purpose, the taxpayers failed to establish investment as the primary purpose for
acquiring and holding the art. 20 9 The court set forth the following factors in

determining whether investment is the primary purpose: (1) the frequency and
degree to which the taxpayer obtains advice from art experts; (2) the expertise of
the taxpayer; (3) the amount of time the taxpayer devotes to the art collection; (4)
the degree of personal use, whether adequate records are maintained; and (5) the
reputation of the taxpayer as being an investor in art. 21 0
After reviewing the case law, one commentator concluded that to be
reasonably certain of the allowance of deductions under I.R.C. § 212 for expenses
incurred with respect to the investment in art,2 1 1 the investor must show the
following: (1) a clear investment intent; (2) a lack of personal use; (3) lack of
conduct inconsistent with investment intent; (4) relatively long holding periods;
(5) more gains than losses upon ultimate sales; (6) a relatively even ratio of
purchases to sales; (7) a lack of personal pleasure or satisfaction; (8) the use of
professional advisors; (9) knowledge of and interest in the business aspects of art
collecting; (10) a lack of engagement in activities with regard to the art collection
common to hobbyists; (11) profit making as the principal motivation; (12) a prior
investigation as to the profit potential; (13) personal attention to the activity; and
(14) a business-like method of accounting. 212

207

Id. at 1319-20.

208

Id.

209

Id. at 1321.

210

Johnson, supra note 205.

211

I.R.C.

§ 212(1), (2). In a recent decision, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer

did not conduct his sports memorabilia activity for profit, applying the nine
factors listed in the Treasury Regulations to be considered in determining
the taxpayer's dominant purpose under I.R.C. § 183. Akey v. Comm'r., T.C.
Memo 2014-211 (2014). See supra text accompanying notes 98-107 (discussing
the factors listed in the Treasury Regulations to be considered in
determining whether an activity is engaged in for profit under I.R.C. § 183).
212

McCarthy, supra note 1, at 36.
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Income Tax Treatment of the Investor in Art

An investor in art is primarily interested in the profits associated with
the selling of art rather than the enjoyment of art as a collector. 213 Establishing the
status of an investor for tax purposes is often difficult because the investor not
only receives the personal benefits of a hobbyist, but also the tax advantages of a
taxpayer with a profit motive. The facts and circumstances that establish a profit
motive as required by I.R.C. § 183 apply in this context as well.2 14 On the other
end of the spectrum, although an investor must be willing to sell art upon
appreciation in value, the sales activity of an investor will not be sufficiently
extensive to result in the classification as an art dealer. 215
1.

The Investor in Art

The investor in art is not subject to the income limitation under I.R.C.
§ 183,216 but he may deduct all of the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in the production and collection of income, and for the management,
conservation, and maintenance of property held for the production of income
under I.R.C. § 212.217 Further, any interest paid on debt incurred to purchase art
is investment interest, which is deductible to the extent of investment income. 218
As the acquisition of art by an investor is a transaction entered into for profit, any
losses realized on the disposition of art are fully deductible. 219 Although expenses
that are capital in nature may not be currently deducted, such expenses increase
the basis of the art. For example, expenses incurred in the acquisition and
220
restoration of art are included in the basis of the art.

213
214

215

216
217
218

219

-

Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316, 1320 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
See supra text accompanying notes 98-112 (providing a detailed examination
of I.R.C. § 183).
McCarthy, supra note 1, at 26, 44 (noting the differences between an investor
and an art dealer).
I.R.C. § 183(b); see McCarthy, supra note 1, at 42.
I.R.C. § 212(1), (2); see McCarthy, supra note 1, at 33.
I.R.C. § 163(d). Generally, personal interest is nondeductible, with the
important exception of qualified residence interest. Id. § 163(h).
Id. § 165(c)(2); see McCarthy, supra note 1, at 29.
I.R.C.

§§ 263, 1016(a)(1).
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Most deductions allowed under I.R.C. § 212 are itemized deductions.221
Unfortunately, deductions allowed under I.R.C. § 212 are also included in the
definition of "miscellaneous itemized deductions."2 Miscellaneous itemized
deductions are allowed only to the extent the investor's total miscellaneous
itemized deductions exceed two percent of the investor's adjusted gross income
for the tax year. 223 Deductions for interest paid on debt incurred to purchase art,

loss deductions for the casualty or theft of art, and deductions for the charitable
contribution of art are among the itemized deductions not included as
miscellaneous itemized deductions. 224
Example: Taxpayer is a history professor who earns $120,000 a
year from the university and is also an investor in art.
Taxpayer's adjusted gross income is $100,000. During the current
tax year, Taxpayer incurred total art related expenses of $2,500
as follows: $300 membership fees; $200 museum entrance fees;
$500 magazines and books; and $1,500 consulting fees.
Assuming these expenses are the only miscellaneous itemized
deduction incurred by Taxpayer during the tax year, Taxpayer's
deduction is limited to $500 ($2,500 minus $2,000 ($100,000
adjusted gross income x 2%)).
The investor's itemized deductions are subject to a further limitation. If
the investor's adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount, the investor
must reduce the allowable itemized deductions by the lesser of: 3% of the excess,
or 80% of the otherwise allowable itemized deductions. 225 Deductions for interest

221

22

2

224
225

Id. §§ 63(d), 67(b). Exceptions include losses from the sale or exchange of
property and deductions attributable to rents and royalties. Id. § 62(a)(3), (4).
Id. § 67(b). The definition of "miscellaneous itemized deduction" includes
itemized deductions other than certain listed deductions, including
deductions for interest, taxes, casualty and theft losses, charitable
contributions, and medical expenses. Id. § 67(b)(1)-(5).
I.R.C. § 67(a). The term "adjusted gross income" is an individual's gross
income minus certain deductions, including trade and business deductions,
deductions for capital losses, deductions attributable to rents and royalties.
Id. § 62(a).

§ 67(b)(1), (3), (4).
Id. § 68(a). For 2013, the threshold amounts are $300,000 for a joint return,
Id.

$275,000 in the case of head of household, and $250,000 for a single taxpayer
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paid on debt incurred to purchase art and losses incurred as a result of the
casualty or theft of art are not subject to this limitation. 226
2.

Distinguishing the Investor from the Art Dealer

Another difficult factual determination is whether a frequent seller of art
should be categorized as an art investor or an art dealer. In Williford v.
Commissioner,227 the Tax Court considered whether a part-time art dealer held
certain paintings for investment or "primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business."22 8 If the paintings were held as
investments, the paintings were capital assets for the purposes of
characterization of gain upon disposition. 229 After applying factors to the facts of
the case, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer did not hold the paintings
primarily for sale to customers in the taxpayer's business. 230 The analysis of the
factors as applied to the facts was as follows: (1) the frequency and regularity of
the sales, which the court considered the most important factor, was
characterized by the court as infrequent, with the sale of only eight paintings,
four in 1984 and four in 1986; (2) the sales were substantial, generating a total
profit of $1,757,875, but were infrequent sales that generated a large profit
attributable to capital appreciation, and not sales effort; (3) the length of time the
paintings were held averaged nineteen years for the paintings sold in 1984 and
thirteen years for the paintings sold in 1986; (4) the taxpayer's personal art
collection and dealer inventory were generally kept separate; (5) the paintings
were not acquired for resale or ever held primarily for sale; (6) the paintings
were not advertised or enhanced in value during the holding period; (7) the
taxpayer did not devote much time or effort to the sale of the paintings; and (8)

who is not a surviving spouse or head of household. Id. § 68(b)(1). After
2013, the threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation. I.R.C. § 68(b)(2).
26

227

Id. § 68(c)(2), (3). Medical expense deductions and wagering losses are also
exempted from the limitation. Id. § 68(c)(1), (3).
Willliford v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422, T.C.M. (RIA) 92, 450 (1992).

m Id. at *4.
2

2

Id. at *5. See infra text accompanying notes 369-74 (discussing the exclusion
of inventory and property held primarily for sale from the definition of
capital asset).
Wiflliford, 64 T.C.M at *13.
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the proceeds from the sales were not used to buy paintings but to buy an
apartment in New York City. 231
D.

Income Tax Treatment of the Art Dealer

A dealer in art is engaged in the business of buying and selling works of
art. The classic example of an art dealer is an individual who owns an art gallery.
Art dealers are taxed the same as any other retail business, resulting in the
income generated from the sale of art held as inventory treated as ordinary
income. 232 Instead of, or in addition to, owning the inventory of art, an art dealer
may show an artist's work on consignment. 233 In this case, the art dealer agrees to
show the work of an artist for a percentage of the sale price. 234 The gallery will
promote the artist and the artist's work, paying for advertising and opening
expenses. 235 The art dealer's consignment income is also ordinary income. 236
The definitional line between an investor in art and an art dealer is as
uncertain as the definitional lines between the other categories of individuals
involved with art.237 An art dealer operating from a commercial gallery is in the
business of buying and selling artwork, but the distinction becomes less clear if
the individual is not operating out of a commercial gallery. 238 The disputes
generally revolve around the meaning of the terms "trade or business,"
"inventory," and "property held primarily for sale to customers." 239 Like the
artist and the collector, the art dealer must have a profit motive, as required by
I.R.C. § 183, in order to fully deduct expenses under I.R.C. § 162.240

231

Id. at *4-7.

232

I.R.C.

233

Lisa Moore & Liz Wheeler,

234

Id. at 552-53

235

Id.

236

I.R.C.

237

McCarthy, supra note 1, at 45.

§§ 61(a)(2), 1221(a)(1).

The Protection of Visual Artists Through
Consignment of Art Statutes, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 552 (2011).

§ 61(a)(1).

3

Id. at 44.

239

Id. at 45.

240

Id. at 46; see supra text accompanying notes 98-112 (providing a detailed
examination of I.R.C. § 183).
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If engaged in a trade or business, the art dealer may deduct all ordinary
and necessary business expenses, including employee salaries, office expenses,
utilities, communication costs, travel expenses, insurance, and rental payments
under I.R.C. § 162.241 Additionally, business losses and bad debts are deductible
as ordinary deductions. 242 The art dealer may deduct $5,000 of start-up expenses
in the year in which the business begins and amortize the balance over a fifteenyear period. 243 A home-office deduction may be available if the art dealer is
operating out of a portion of a personal residence or a separate structure not
attached to the residence. 244 The art dealer must also capitalize all direct and
indirect costs incurred in the acquisition and sale of artwork but is exempt from
the uniform capitalization rules if the average annual gross receipts for the three
previous tax years do not exceed $10 million.245
I.R.C. § 274 disallows or limits certain deductions, otherwise allowable
under I.R.C. §§ 162 and 212, which have elements of both personal pleasure and
profit motive.246 For example, travelling expenses are not deductible unless the
trip is primarily related to the taxpayer's business. 24 7 Meal and entertainment
expenses must be directly related to or associated with the active conduct of
business, and the amount of the deduction is limited to 50% of the expenses. 248

241
242

243

244

245

246
247

248

I.R.C. § 162(a).
Id. §§ 165(c)(1), 166(a). Nonbusiness bad debts are treated as short-term
capital losses. Id. § 165(d).
Id. § 195(a)-(b). The $5,000 deductible amount is reduced by the amount by
which the start-up expenditures exceed $50,000. The term "start-up
expenditures" is defined as otherwise deductible expenses incurred in
connection with investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade or
business, or creating an active trade or business. Id. § 195(c)(1).
I.R.C. § 280A; see discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing in detail the homeoffice deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 280A(c)).
I.R.C. § 263A(b)(2); see supra text accompanying note 115 (providing a
general discussion of the uniform capitalization rules).
MCDANIEL ET AL.,

supra note 21, at 650.

Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1). Whether a trip is primarily business or personal
depends on the facts and circumstances, especially the relative time spent on
each category of activity. Id. § 1.162-2(b)(2). Foreign travel and business
conventions and other meetings are also subject to certain restrictions. I.R.C.
§ 274(c), (h).
Id.

§ 274(a), (n).
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The deduction for business gifts is limited to $25 per year, per beneficiary.249
Furthermore, adequate records or other corroborating evidence must be kept to
substantiate expenses for business travel, meals and entertainment, and gifts. 2 50
Art investors and dealers are also subject to the at-risk provisions and
the passive-loss provisions. 251 Generally, the at-risk provisions limit the ability of
the taxpayer to deduct losses generated by any investment or business activity to
the amount the taxpayer is at risk in the activity.252 The taxpayer is at risk with
respect to the amount of money and the basis of property contributed to the
activity, the amount of debt incurred with respect to the activity for which the
taxpayer is personally liable, and the net fair market value of property securing
debt incurred with respect to the activity for which the taxpayer is not personally
liable.2 53 Generally, the passive-loss provisions allow the taxpayer to deduct
passive losses only to the extent of the passive income.2 54 A passive activity
means any investment or business activity in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate.255 A taxpayer materially participates in an activity only if

249

Id. § 274(b)(1). The term "gift" is defined as an item excludible from the
recipient's gross income under I.R.C. § 102. Id. § 274(b)(1). For an item to be
excluded from the recipient's gross income under I.R.C. § 102, the
transferor's dominant intent must proceed from "detached and disinterested
generosity." Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (internal
quotations omitted).

-

I.R.C. § 274(d)(1)-(3). Expenses incurred with respect to listed property as
defined in I.R.C. § 280F(d)(4) must also be substantiated. Id. § 274(d)(4).

21

Id.

252

Id. § 465(a)(1), (c). For the purposes of I.R.C. § 465, a "loss" means the excess
of allowable deductions over the income generated by the activity for the tax
year. Id. § 465(d). Any excess losses may be carried forward to the next tax
year. I.R.C. § 465(a)(2).

253

Id. § 465(b)(1), (2).

2

Id. § 469(a)(1), (c)(6), (d)(1). For the purposes of I.R.C. § 469, a "loss" means
the excess of passive losses over passive income for the tax year. Id.
§ 469(d)(1). Any excess passive losses may be carried forward to the next tax
year. Id. § 469(b).

255

I.R.C. § 469(c).

§§ 465(c)(3), 469(c)(6).
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the taxpayer is involved in the operations of the activity on a basis that is regular,
continuous, and substantial. 256
1.

Definition of Trade or Business

In order to determine whether an artist is in the business of creating art,
or whether a collector is in the business of selling art, the meaning of the term
"trade or business" must be explored. In Higgins v. Commissioner, the Supreme
Court stated that whether the activities of a taxpayer constitute the carrying on of
a trade or business requires an examination of the facts and circumstances of
each case.2 57 In Higgins, the taxpayer incurred substantial expenses in managing
his extensive portfolio of stocks and bonds through offices located in New York
and Paris. 25 8 The taxpayer argued that his activities were carried on with
sufficient "elements of continuity, constant repetition, regularity and extent," as
distinguished from the occasional activities of the small investor. 259 The Supreme
Court held that the management of one's own investments, "[njo matter how
large the estate or how continuous or extended the work," did not constitute the
carrying on of a trade or business. 260
In Commissioner v. Groetzinger, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a full-time gambler who made wagers solely for his own account was
engaged in a "trade or business" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162(a).2 61 The
taxpayer devoted 60 to 80 hours per week to pari-mutuel wagering, primarily on
dog races, with intent to earn a living from such activities. 262 The taxpayer

257

Id. § 469(h)(1). The Treasury Regulations establish safe harbors for material
participation by the taxpayer for the tax year. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T.
Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).

258

Id. at 214.

2

Id. at 215.
Id. at 218. The U.S. Congress responded to the Higgins decision by enacting
the predecessor to I.R.C. subsections 212(1) and (2), with retroactive effect.
55 Stat. 798 at 819, § 121.

256

260

26

Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 24 (1987). The Supreme Court also
determined whether the taxpayer conducted a trade or business for the
purposes of I.R.C. 62(1), which allows an individual to deduct trade or
business expenses, other than the trade or business of the performing
services as an employee, from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross
income. Id.

262

Id.
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gambled solely for his own account and had no other employment. 263 For the
taxable year at issue, his efforts generated gross winnings of $70,000 on bets of
$72,032, for a net gambling loss of $2,032.264 The Court observed that the I.R.C.,
the Treasury Regulations, and judicial decisions have not provided a definitive
and generally applicable definition for the terms "trade or business," "carrying
on a trade or business," or "engaging in a trade or business." 265
Reviewing prior decisions, the Supreme Court, in Groetzinger,
acknowledged that holding oneself out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods and services usually results in being considered as engaged in a trade or
business, but such activities are not a prerequisite to being engaged in a trade or
business. 266 The Supreme Court also acknowledged that not every incomeproducing and profit-making activity constitutes a trade or business.267 To be
engaged in a trade or business, the "taxpayer must be involved in the activity
with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer's primary purpose for
engaging in the activity must be for income or profit."2 68 Applying a common
sense concept of a trade or business, the Supreme Court concluded that "if one's
gambling activity is pursued full-time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the
production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby, it is a trade or
business."2 69 In its holding, the Court adhered to the general position of the
Higgins Court that the resolution of the issue of whether a taxpayer is engaged in
a trade or business requires an examination of the facts of each case. 270

263

Id.

264

Id. at 25.

265

Id. at 27.

266

Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33-34.

267

Id. at 35.

268

Id.

269

Id.

270

Id. at 36 (citing Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941)). The Supreme
Court considered the imposition of a judicially formulated test for all
purposes, considering the wide utilization in various contexts of the term
"trade or business" within the Internal Revenue Code, "counterproductive,
unhelpful, and even somewhat precarious for the overall integrity of the
Code" and left to Congress any repair or revision if needed, which is where
the ultimate responsibility rests. Id.
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Trade or Business of Buying and Selling Art

Whether the taxpayer holds art as an investment or primarily for sale is a
difficult factual determination that has generated a vast body of litigation.271 If
the art is held as an investment, then the art is a capital asset, and any gain on the
sale or exchange of the art will be taxed at a preferential rate. 2 7 2 But if art is held
as inventory or primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business, then the art
is a noncapital asset and any gain on the sale is ordinary income taxed at
ordinary progressive rates. 273 The factors that indicate whether art is held
primarily for investment or sale include: (1) the frequency and regularity of the
sales; (2) the substantiality of the sales; (3) the length of time the art was held; (4)
the nature and extent of the taxpayer's business and the extent to which the
taxpayer segregated the art from business inventory; (5) the purpose for which
the taxpayer acquired and held the art before the sale; (6) the extent of the
taxpayer's sales efforts by advertising or otherwise; (7) the time and effort that
the taxpayer devoted to the sales; and (8) how the sales proceeds were used. 2 7 4
In Hollis v. United States, the issue before the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio was whether oriental objects of art sold by the taxpayer
were capital assets or held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business.2 75
The district court clarified that the stated purpose for which property is acquired
is entitled to some weight but the ultimate determination is the purpose for
which the property is held. 27 6 In Hollis, the taxpayer imported oriental objects of
art from Japan with the stated purpose of holding the objects for investment and
disposing of them after sufficient appreciation in value. 2 7 7 Nevertheless, the
district court held that the objects of art were held primarily for sale to
customers, thus, generating ordinary income. In reaching its conclusion, the
district court found: (1) the sales efforts commenced immediately upon the
import of the art objects; (2) the sales were made within a short period of time

supra note 175, ¶ 31.04[2]

271

BITTKER ET AL.,

272

See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1221(a); id. § 1222(3).

273

See infra Part III.B. (discussing in the characterization and treatment of
capital gains and losses).

274

Williford v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422, *4 (T.C. 1992).

275

Hollis v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 191, 192 (N.D. Ohio 1954).

276

Id. at 194.

277

Id.
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after importation; and (3) the sales were regular, substantial, and continuous. 2 78
Because of the restricted market and the nature of the property, the taxpayer did
not have to advertise or publish price lists to generate sales and substantial
profits. 279 The district court was not persuaded by the fact that the taxpayer did
not intend to reinvest the profits in the acquisition of oriental objects of art for
future sale. 280

E.

Income Tax Treatment of the Business Collector

In the ordinary course of business, a business collector acquires art for
display on the business premises. Whether an individual or corporation or other
business entity, the artwork chosen for display is often considered as important
as any other aspect of the business.
Corporate buyers are looking to complete their space in an
interesting way. They also select paintings, photography and
sculptures for their employees' enjoyment and to project a
certain image. Some view their art as an extension of their
corporate work life. I enjoy the challenge of coming up with a
plan that reflects what a client wants to say about itself. 281
The art held by the business collector is not inventory but property used
in the taxpayer's business. For example, a doctor acquires paintings to decorate
new office space.2 8 2 To determine the tax treatment of the art upon acquisition
and disposition, the question that must be addressed is whether art used in a
business is depreciable property. If the art is not depreciable property, the art is a

278

279

See id. at 195; see also Chandor v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 721, 726 (1957) (holding
that a single sale or an isolated transaction does not constitute the holding
by the taxpayer of portraits primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of the taxpayer's business, stating, "[clarrying on a business,
however, implies an occupational undertaking to which one habitually
devotes time, attention, or effort with substantial regularity").
Hollis, 121 F. Supp. at 195.

280

Id.

281

Jean Efron, Art Makes a Statement for Business, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/jobs/art-as-an-extension-of-thecorporate-image.html?_r=2&ref=design&.

282

Associated Obstetricians and Gynecologist, P.C. v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 38, 39
(6th Cir. 1985).
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capital asset, and any gain is subject to preferential tax treatment.2 83 If the art is
depreciable property, the art is a noncapital asset, and the character of any gains
or losses upon disposition is determined under I.R.C. § 1231.284 Unfortunately,
whether art used in a business is depreciable property is still uncertain; the I.R.S.
takes the position that business art is not depreciable.2 85
III.

TAX PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO THE HOLDERS OF ART

Once the difficult task of classifying the individual's relationship to art
has been accomplished, the tax provisions applicable to the individual are fairly
easy to identify. But the application of those provisions to art specifically is often
challenging. The following section explores specific provisions of the I.R.C. that
apply to certain categories of individuals and raises some of the unanswered
questions. The specific tax provisions examined in greater detail in this section
are: the allowance of the home-office deduction; the treatment of capital gains
and losses on the disposition of art; the allowance of a depreciation deduction for
business art; the nonrecognition of gain and the allowance of a loss deduction on
the casualty and theft of art; and the nonrecognition of gain on the exchange of
art.

A.

The Home-Office Deduction

In 1976, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 280A to prevent taxpayers from
converting nondeductible personal and living expenses into deductible trade or
business expenses by claiming their residence contains a home office. 286
Nevertheless, if the requirements of I.R.C. § 280A are satisfied, an artist or an art

2s3

See I.R.C. §§ 1221(a), § 1(h); see also infra Part III.B. (discussing the
characterization and treatment of capital gains and losses).

2s

See I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(2), 1231(b)(1); see also infra Part III.B. (discussing the
characterization and treatment of capital gains and losses).

2

See infra Part III.C. (analyzing the allowability of depreciation deductions for
business art).

26

BrnKER ET AL., supra note 175, ¶ 13.10[1] (citing Staff of Joint Comm. on
Tax'n, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, at 85 (1987)). Unless specifically provided in the Internal Revenue
Code, no deductions are allowed "for personal, living, or family expenses."
I.R.C. § 262(a).
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dealer may deduct the expenses allocable to the use of a portion of the residence
or a separate structure adjacent to the residence as a studio or art gallery.2 87
I.R.C. § 280A allows a taxpayer to deduct, to a limited extent, expenses
2
incurred in connection with the business use of a personal residence. 88 Pursuant
to I.R.C. § 280A, deductions are allowed only to the extent expenses are
attributable to the business use of the residence and allocable to the portion of
the residence unit exclusively used on a regular basis as (1) the principal place of
business of the taxpayer; (2) the place of business that is used by patients, clients,
or customers meeting with the taxpayer in the normal course of business; or (3)
in the case of an unattached structure, in connection with the business of the
taxpayer.2 89 If these requirements are satisfied, the deductions are subject to an
overall income limitation. 290
In Soliman v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was a self-employed
anesthesiologist who administered anesthesia in three hospitals and used a room
in his residence exclusively as an office on a regular basis. 291Because the taxpayer
was not provided an office at the hospitals, he performed administrative tasks
essential to his medical practice in the office in his residence. 29 2 In denying the
taxpayer a deduction for his home office, the Supreme Court held that the

2

28

I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1). l.R.C. §280A also applies to the portion of the personal
residence used to regularly store inventory or samples held for use in
taxpayer's retail or wholesale business if the residence is the only fixed
location of the business; as a rental if the taxpayer uses the dwelling unit as a
personal residence during the year; or in the taxpayer's business of
providing daycare services. Id. § 280A(c)(2)-(4), (e).
Id. § 280A(c)(1), (2), (5). I.R.C. § 280A generally denies all deductions with
respect to a dwelling unit that is used by the taxpayer as a residence during
the year. Id. § 280A(a). Nevertheless, I.R.C. § 280A(b) provides an exception
to this general disallowance for otherwise allowable deductions, e.g.,
qualified residence interest, real property taxes, and casualty losses. J.R.C. §§
280A(b), 163(h)(3), 164(a)(1), 165(c)(3). A dwelling unit is used as a personal
residence if used for personal purposes for a number of days which exceeds
the greater of 14 days or 10% of the number of days the dwelling unit is
rented at a fair rental value. Id. § 280A(d)(1).

289

Id. § 280A(c)(1).

290

Id. § 280A(c)(5).

291

Soliman v. Comm'r, 113 S.Ct. 701, 704 (1993).

292

Id.
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taxpayer's "principal place of business" is the "most important or significant"
location of the taxpayer's business, as determined by two primary
considerations: (1) the relative importance of the activities performed at each
business location, and (2) the time spent at each location. 293 The location where
goods and services are delivered is given greater weight in this relative
importance analysis. 294 In applying the 'relative importance' test, the Supreme
Court found that the services the taxpayer provided at the hospitals were the
"essence" of his medical practice and the hospitals were the point where he
delivered services to his patients. 295 In response to Soliman, Congress amended
I.R.C. § 280A, providing that a portion of the residence qualifies as the taxpayer's
principal place of business if (1) the home office is used by the taxpayer to
conduct the administrative or management activities of the business, and (2) the
business does not have another fixed location at which the taxpayer conducts
substantial administrative or management activities. 296
I.R.C. § 280A also allows a home office deduction for the portion of the
residence exclusively used on a regular basis as a place of business where the
taxpayer meets patients, clients, or customers in the normal course of business,
and-in the case of a separate structure not attached to the residence-in
connection with the taxpayer's business. 297 Thus, if the artist or art dealer
regularly meets with customers in a portion of the residence used exclusively for
the creation, display or sale of art, the artist or art dealer may claim a home office
deduction even though the space does not qualify as the principal place of
business. 29 8 Further, if the artist or art dealer uses a structure separate from the
dwelling unit exclusively and regularly in connection with the trade or business

293

Id. at 706.

294

See id.; see also Rev. Rul. 94-24, 1994-1 C.B. 87 (announcing that the Internal
Revenue Service will determine a taxpayer's principal place of business by
first applying the relative importance test to compare the business activities
of the taxpayer at each location and, if the test does not provide a definitive
answer, then examining the relative time spent at each location).

2s

297

Soliman, 113 S.Ct. at 708.
I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1). The taxpayer falls within this provision even when
substantial administrative and management business activities are
performed by others for the taxpayer outside the residence. H.R. REP. No.
148, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 407-08 (1997).
I.R.C. § 280A(c)(2), (3).

298

BITTKER ET AL., supra note 175,

296

1 13.10[2][a].
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of creating and selling art, a home office deduction is allowed even though the
structure is a secondary location.2 99
To qualify, the space within the residence or the unattached structure
must be used exclusively and on a regular basis in the taxpayer's business." The
space or structure must be used exclusively for business purposes, and, if the
space or structure is used for more than one business, each business must qualify
under I.R.C. § 280A.3o1 Additionally, the space or structure must be used as a
business and not merely as a profit-seeking activity. 302 Further, the requirement
of regular business use of the space or structure is not satisfied by occasional or
incidental business use.303 Finally, an employee may not take deductions for the
business use of a residence unless the use is for the convenience of the
employer,04 which results in employees being allowed to claim a home office
deduction only in the most extraordinary circumstances3 5 As a result, the artist
must be in the business of creating art for profit, and the art dealer must be in the
business of acquiring art primarily for sale to customers. The space in the
residence or the structure must be used exclusively and on a regular basis for

299

Id.

mo

I.R.C. § 280A(c).

31

Hamacher v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 348, 359 (1990) (holding that no deduction of
expenses was allowed because the office in the residence was used by the
taxpayer as the principal place of business of a sole proprietorship and also
to perform work for an employer that was not for the convenience of the
employer); see supra Part II.D.1. (defining "trade or business" for federal

302

income tax purposes).
See Groetzinger v. Comm'r, 40 U.S. 23, 30 (1987) (holding that in order to be
engaged in a trade or business the taxpayer must be involved in the activity
with continuity and regularity, and the taxpayer's primary purpose for
engaging in the activity must be for income or profit); Higgins v. Comm'r,
312 U.S. 212, 478 (1941) (holding that managing investments, no matter how
continuous or extended, does not constitute carrying on a business).

303

See W.M. Christine v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1 58,259 (2010) (disallowing the
deductions under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1), as the author failed to provide
information concerning the amount of time spent writing at home).

3

I.R.C.

§ 280A(c)(1). As a result of the convenience of the employer

requirement, employees are only allowed to claim a home office deduction
only in the most extraordinary circumstances. BITrKER ET AL., supra note 175,

1 13.10[2][a].
30

BnrrKER ET AL., supra note 175,

1 13.10[2][a].
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such business purposes for the artist or art dealer to claim a home office
deduction.
Even if the taxpayer satisfies the business-use requirement and the
exclusively-used-on-a-regular-basis requirement, the amount of the deductions
allowed for the home office is severely limited. First, the deductions allowed may
not exceed the amount of income generated by the business use of the
residence.3 6 To determine the amount of income, the expenses incurred by the
business apart from the use of the residence, e.g., expenses for secretarial
support, supplies, and business telephone, are subtracted from the gross income
generated by the business.3) Second, the expenses allocable to the portion of the
residence used for business purposes must be determined by a reasonable
method.08 Generally, the method of allocating expenses is based on the
percentage of the total floor space of the residence used for business purposes?)0
Third, the expenses allocable to the business use of the residence, limited
by the amount of income generated by the business use,310 are allowed in the
following order: (1) the allocable portion of the deductions allowable without
regard to any business use of the residence, for example, qualified residence
interest 311 and real estate taxes; 312 (2) to the extent of any excess income, the
allocable portion of the deductions allowable for the business use of the
residence that do not result in an adjustment to the basis of the property, for
example, utilities, homeowner's insurance, and repair and maintenance;313 (3) to

306

3

-

3

I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5)(A); Prop. Treas. Reg.
52404 (Aug. 7, 1980).

§ 1.280A-2(i), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399,

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(2)(ii).
Id. § 1.280A-2(i)(3). Expenses which are attributable exclusively to a
particular portion of the dwelling unit will be allocated in full to that portion
of the dwelling unit, e.g., painting and repairs. Id.
Id. If the rooms in the dwelling unit are of approximately equal size, the
taxpayer may also allocate expenses according to the number of rooms used
for business and nonbusiness purposes. Id. Expenses which are not related
to the use of the dwelling unit for business purposes are not taken into
account, e.g., lawn care. Id.

310

I.R.C.

311

Id.

§ 280A(c)(5).

312

§ 163(h)(3).
Id. § 164(a)(1).

313

Id. § 162(a).
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the extent of any excess income, the allocable portion of the deductions allowable
for the business use of the residence that result in an adjustment to the basis of
the property, for example, depreciation deduction.314 Any business related
deductions not allowed within the current year due to the income limitation may
be carried over to the subsequent year.315
Example: Taxpayer is an artist who uses a portion of a personal
residence, exclusively and on a regular basis, as an art studio.
During the current tax year, Taxpayer earned $50,000 from the
sale of art and incurred $10,000 of art related expenses for
advertising, travel, supplies, etc. . Taxpayer's studio occupies
approximately 20% of the total floor space of the residence.
Annually, Taxpayer pays qualified residence interest of $5,000
and real property taxes of $4,000. The other expenses relating to
the residence, i.e., utilities, insurance, and repairs and
maintenance, total $6,000. If the entire residence was used for
business purposes, the depreciation deduction for the year
would be $8,000. Taxpayer's deductions for the business use of
the residence for the tax year are limited to Taxpayer's net
income from the business $40,000 ($50,000 gross income minus
$10,000 business expenses). The income limit will first be applied
against 20% of the qualified residence interest and real property
taxes $1,800 (($5,000 plus $4,000) x 20%), then 20% of the cost of
utilities, insurance, and repairs and maintenance $1,200 ($6,000 x
20%), and, finally, 20% of the depreciation deduction $1,600
($8,000 x 20%). Because the income generated by the business
use of the residence exceeds the deductions ($40,000 income
minus $4,600 deductions ($1,800 plus $1,200 plus $1,600)), the
deductions attributable to the business use of the residence are
fully allowed. Taxpayer may also claim as deductions the
business expenses unrelated to the business use of the residence
and the qualified residence interest of $5,000 and real property
taxes of $4,000.
In 2013, the Secretary of the Treasury published Revenue Procedure
2013-13,316 establishing an optional safe harbor method to determine the amount

314

Id. §§ 167(a), 168, 1016(a)(2), 280A(c)(5); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(5).

315

I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).

316

Rev. Proc. 2013-13, 2013-6 I.R.B. 478 (2013).
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of deductible expenses attributable to the business use of a residence.317 The safe
harbor method is an alternative to the calculation, allocation, and substantiation
of actual expenses. 318 Generally, if the business use of the residence satisfies the
requirements of I.R.C. § 280A(c), 319 the taxpayer may elect 320 to calculate the
amount of deductible expenses by multiplying the allowable square footage of
the business-use portion of the residence, not to exceed 300 square feet,3 2 1by the
prescribed rate of $5 per square foot. 32 2 Thus, the maximum deduction under the

safe harbor method is limited to $1,500 (300 square feet x $5 rate). 323 The
deductible amount computed under the safe harbor method may not exceed the

317

Id. at. 478, § 1. The safe harbor method was established in recognition that
the calculation, allocation, and substantiation of actual expenses attributable
to the business use of a residence can be "complex and burdensome for the
small business owner." Id. at 479, § 2.07.

318

Id. at 478, § 1.

3

Id. at 480,

320

Rev. Proc. 2013-13, 2013-6 I.R.B. at 480, §4.01. Annually, the taxpayer may
elect to use the safe harbor method or to calculate and substantiate actual
expenses for the purposes of I.R.C. § 280A(c). Id. at 479, § 4.03.
Revenue Procedure 2013-13 provides adjustments for determining the
allowable square footage for a taxpayer with a business use of residence
home for only a part of the tax year, or a taxpayer who changes the square
footage for a business use of the residence during the tax year. Id. at 480, §
4.08.

321

3

3

§ 4.08(1).

Id. at 478, § 4.01. The prescribed rate may be updated as warranted. Id. at
479, § 4.01(3).
If the taxpayer elects the safe harbor method for the tax year, the taxpayer
may not deduct any actual expenses related to the ,usiness use of the
residence for that year. Rev. Proc. 2013-13, 2013-6 I.R.B. at 479, § 4.01(4).
Nevertheless, the taxpayer may deduct any expenses related to the residence
that are allowable without regard to the business use of the residence. Id. at
479, § 4.04. The taxpayer may deduct any trade or business expenses
unrelated to the business use of the residence. Id. at 480, § 4.05. Under the
safe harbor method, no depreciation deduction or other cost recovery
deduction is allowed, and the depreciation deduction for the tax year is
deemed to be zero. Id. at 480, §§ 4.06-07 (providing rules for taking a
depreciation deduction if the taxpayer calculates and substantiates actual
expenses for the purposes of I.R.C. § 280A for any subsequent tax year).
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income derived from the business use of the residence. 324 Any amount of
deduction in excess of the income limitation is disallowed and may not be
carried over to the subsequent year. 325

Capital Gains and Losses on the Dispositionof Art

B.

Capital gains have received preferential tax treatment since 1921,
whereas capital losses have been subject to restrictions since 1924.326 An early
justification for the preference for capital gains is to provide relief from the
higher tax rates imposed on gain realized in the tax year but accrued over a
number of years.32 7 Although the statutory details for the treatment of capital
gains have varied widely over the decades, the current preferential treatment is
implemented by I.R.C. § 1(h), which provides an alternative tax formula in
determining tax liability if the taxpayer's activities produce a net capital gain for
the tax year.3 28 The term "net capital gain" means the excess of net long-term
capital gain (long-term capital gains minus long-term capital losses) minus net
short-term capital loss (short-term capital losses minus short-term capital
gains). 329 Thus, long-term capital gains are necessary, and must survive the
netting process, for the taxpayer to benefit from the preferential treatment.

324

Id. at 480, § 4.08(2). The income derived from the business use of the
residence is the gross income reduced by any business expenses unrelated to
the use of the residence, e.g., expenses for advertising, wages, and supplies.
Id. at 480, §§ 4.05, 4.08(2).

325

Id. at 478,

§ 4.08(2). A taxpayer who uses the safe harbor method cannot

deduct, in the current tax year, any excess deductions carried over from a
prior tax year during which the taxpayer calculated and substantiated actual
expenses but can deduct the excess deductions in the next tax year in which
the taxpayer again calculates and substantiates actual expenses for the
purposes of I.R.C. § 280A. Id. at 478, § 4.08(3).

supra note 175, 1 31.01.

326

BITTKER ET AL.,

327

David Block & William McBride, Why Capital Gains are taxed at a Lower Rate,
TAx FouND. (June 27, 2012), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/why-capital-gains-

are-taxed-lower-rate.
3

329

I.R.C. § 1(h)(1);

BITrKER ET AL., supra note 175, 1 31.01. The preferential
treatment for net capital gain is available to individuals, trusts, and estates.
I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e), (h)(1). The preferential treatment for net capital gain is not
available to corporate taxpayers. Id. §§ 11, 1201 (a).

Id.

§ 1222(1)-(4), (11).

118

AIPLA Q.J.

Vol. 43:1

Generally, long-term capital gain is the result of a sale or exchange3 of a
capital asset331 held for more than one year. 332 Whereas ordinary income is subject
to tax rates that progress from 10% to 39.6%,3 depending on the type of the
property giving rise to the capital gain, long-term capital gain is subject to three
different maximum rates of tax: 31 28% for collectibles gain335 and § 1202 gain; 3 6

3

331
332

13

See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 251 (1941)
(finding that the term "sale or exchange" is narrower than the term "sale or
other disposition"); Spalding v. Comm'r, 7 B.T.A. 588, 590 (1927) (defining a
"sale" as a transfer of property or money for some promise to pay money,
and an "exchange" as a transfer of property for other property or services);
see Helvering, 313 U.S. at 250-51 (holding that the taxpayer did not exchange
property when it was compensated through insurance for a business plant
destroyed by fire).
I.R.C. § 1221(a).
Id. § 1222(3); see Rev. Rul. 66-7, 1966-1 C.B. 188 (excluding the day of
acquisition and including the day of disposition in determining the holding
period of a capital asset). See I.R.C. § 1223 (allowing the tacking of holding
periods). Many sections of the Internal Revenue Code deem elements
necessary for gains and losses to be characterized as capital. See, e.g., id.
§ 166(d) (providing short-term capital loss treatment for nonbusiness bad
debts).
Id. § 1(a)-(d), (h)(1)(A), (i). The 39.6% bracket applies to income above:
$450,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns; $425,000 for heads of
households; $400,000 for single taxpayers; and $225,000 for married
taxpayers filing separately. Id. § 1(i)(3). The threshold amounts are adjusted
for inflation. Id. § 1(i)(3)(C).

3

I.R.C. § 1(h). Short-term capital gains are taxed at ordinary income rates. Id.
§1(h)(1)(A). Long-term capital losses and short-term capital losses are
reflected as follows: (1) the netting of capital gains and capital losses occurs
first within each rate classification; (2) any net capital losses within any
classification are applied first against net capital gains taxed at the 28% rate,
then the 25% rate, then the 15% or 20% rate; and (3) any net long-term
capital losses or net short-term capital losses carried over from a prior tax
year are applied first to the 28% rate. Id. § 1(h)(1), (4).

-3

Id. §§ 1(h)(5)(A), 408(m)(2).

36

Id. § 1(h)(1), (4). The term "section 1202 gain" means the gain on the sale of
qualified small business stock in excess of the amount of gain excluded from
gross income under I.R.C. § 1202. See id. § 1202 (allowing an exclusion from
gross income of 50 %of the gain on the sale of qualified small business stock
held for more than five years).
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25% for non-recaptured § 1250 gain;337 and 15% for adjusted net capital gain.338
For the high-income taxpayers who are subject to the 39.6% rate, the tax rate on
adjusted net capital gain increases to 20%.9 The term "collectibles gain and loss"
means the gain or loss from the sale of a collectible as defined in I.R.C. §
408(m).3 This section defines "collectible" as "any work of art, any rug or
antique, any metal or gem, any stamp or coin, any alcoholic beverage, or any
other property specified by the Secretary ... " 34 1
Capital gains may also be subject to the 3.8% tax on net investment
income under I.R.C. § 1411.342 "Although the revenue from the tax imposed by
§ 1411 is earmarked for Medicare, the provision operates as an income tax
surtax." 4 3 Generally, the net investment income tax is 3.8% of the lesser of (1) net
investment income, or (2) modified adjusted gross income,2 over the threshold
amount.345 Net investment income includes interest, dividends, royalties, and
rents other than income derived in the ordinary course of business,3 4 6 and net

gain attributable to the disposition of property other than property held in a

-

The term "unrecaptured section 1250 gain" means the gain on the sale of
depreciable real property attributable to depreciation deductions taken
during the holding period of the property. Id. § 1(h)(6)(A). Cost-recovery
deductions result in the decrease in the basis of the property. Id. § 1016(a)(2).

3

The term "adjusted net capital gain" means the gain on the sale of property
other than collectibles gain, section 1202 gain, and unrecaptured § 1250 gain,
plus qualified dividend income. Id. § 1(h)(3). For taxpayers in the 10% or
15% income tax brackets, the tax rate on adjusted net capital gain is zero. Id.
§ 1(h)(1)(B).

-9

I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D).

340

Id.

341

342
3
--

34
34

§ 1(h)(5)(A).
Id. § 408(m)(2); see id. § 408(m)(3) (excluding certain coins and bullion from
the meaning of the term "collectibles").
Id. § 1411 applies to individuals, estates, and trusts. Id. § 1411(a)(1).
BITrKER ET AL.,

supra note 175, 1 2.02[21.

I.R.C. § 1411(d). The term "modified adjusted gross income" means adjusted
gross income plus any amount excluded as foreign earned income under
I.R.C. § 911(a)(1). See BrITKER ET AL., supra note 175, 1 2.02[2].
I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1).

Id. § 1411(c)(2) (finding that net investment income includes business income
from a passive activity and trading financial instruments and commodities).
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*

business.347 The threshold amounts are: $250,000 for joint filers or surviving
spouses, $125,000 for married individuals filing separately, and $200,000 for
other taxpayers.
Contrary to the preferential tax treatment for capital gains, Congress
restricted the ability of a taxpayer to deduct capital losses in the year sustained to
counterbalance the preference for capital gains and to lessen control over the
timing of capital gains and capital losses.34 9 For non-corporate taxpayers, I.R.C. §
1211(b) limits the deduction of capital losses to the amount of capital gains, plus,
if capital losses exceed capital gains, a maximum of $3,000 of the excess, with any
unused capital losses carried forward to the next tax year.3 5 Of course, before the
character of a loss is relevant, the loss must be an allowable deduction under
I.R.C. § 165.351 For an individual, a loss deduction is allowed if incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business, or a transaction entered into for profit. 35 2 But if art is
created or held by the taxpayer merely for personal pleasure, a loss deduction is
allowed only in the case of a casualty or theft.35 3

334

asset.

Capital gains and losses are the result of a sale or exchange of a capital
I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) defines a "capital asset" as property held by the

347

Id. § 1411(c)(1).

-8

Id. § 1411(b).

3

H.R. REP. No. 67-1388, 1-2 (1923).

35

I.R.C. §§ 1211(a), (b), 1212(a), (b) (2012). The mechanism of I.R.C. § 1212(b)
preserves the character of the capital losses as either long-term capital losses
or short-term capital losses. The unused capital loss carryovers expire with
the death of the taxpayer who sustained the losses. BITTKER ET AL., supra note
175, 1 31.02[4]. For corporate taxpayers, I.R.C. § 1211(a) limits the deduction
of capital losses to the amount of capital gains, with any unused capital
losses carried back three years and then carried forward five years as shortterm capital losses.

351

352

I.R.C. § 165(a) (2012) The amount of a loss deduction is limited to the basis of
the property. Id. § 165(b).
Id. § 165(c)(1)-(2).

53

Id. § 165(c). See infra text accompanying notes 495-99 (discussing the
allowability of a deduction for a loss arising from the casualty or theft of a
personal use asset).

3-

I.R.C.

§ 1222(1)-(4) (2012).
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taxpayer whether or not connected with the taxpayer's trade or business. 355 Thus,
all property held by the taxpayer, including personal-use property, qualifies as
capital assets. 356 Accordingly, the art collected and held for personal pleasure or
investment are capital assets and will produce capital gains or losses upon sale or
exchange.
Nevertheless, the definition of a capital asset includes eight specific
exceptions, 357 which have been broadly interpreted. For instance,
[T]he term "capital asset" is to be construed narrowly in
accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital-gains
treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of
appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time,
and thus to ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the entire gain
in one year.358
Excluded from the definition of capital asset is "a copyright, a literary,
musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property
held by a taxpayer whose personal effort created such property."359 The
exception also includes a taxpayer who receives such property from the creator

3s5

Id. § 1221.

356

See id.

3

I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)-(8). Generally, the exceptions include: (1) inventory and
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business; (2) depreciable personal property and real property used in
business; (3) a copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter,
memorandum or similar property created by the taxpayer; (4) accounts or
notes received for the sale of inventory and performance of services; (5) a
publication of the U.S. government; (6) any commodities financial
instrument held by a dealer; (7) any clearly identified hedging transaction;
and (8) supplies regularly consumed in the ordinary course of business. Id.
-

3

Comm'r v. Gillette Motor Transp. Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(A) (stating that with regard to a letter, memorandum, or
similar property, the exception also includes the taxpayer for whom such

property was prepared or produced); Id. § 1221(a)(3)(B) (stating that at the
election of the taxpayer, the sale or exchange of musical compositions or
copyrights in musical works will be not be treated as a noncapital asset
pursuant to Id. § 1221(a)(1) & (3)), I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3)).
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with a transferred basis.360 The Treasury Regulations define the phrase "or
similar property" by way of examples, including a theatrical production, a radio
program, a newspaper cartoon strip, or any other property eligible for copyright,
as opposed to, patent protection. 6 ' The Treasury Regulations further state that
the personal efforts of the taxpayer are 'property' if the taxpayer performs
literary, theatrical, musical, artistic, or other creative or productive work that
affirmatively contributes to the creation of the property or directs and guides
362
others in the performance of such work.

In 1950, Congress created the exception for self-created property to
prevent amateur writers and artists from obtaining capital gains treatment on the
sale of their work whereas professional writers and artists received ordinary
income treatment. 36' As a result, if an artist creates a work of art, the gain on the
sale of the art is ordinary income because the artist is selling a noncapital asset. 64
If a taxpayer receives art from the artist as a gift or incident to a divorce,365 the
gain on the sale of the art is ordinary income because the taxpayer is also selling
a noncapital asset. 6 But a taxpayer who inherits art from a deceased artist will
have capital gains treatment on the sale of the art because the basis of the art is
not a transferred basis but the value of the art on the date of the artist's death.367

360

361

362

3

364
36s

Id. § 1221(a)(3)(C). The term "transferred basis" means a basis determined in
whole or in part by reference to the basis of the property in the hands of the
transferor. Id. § 7701(a)(43).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1) (2014).
I.R.C. § 1.1221-1(c)(3). But a taxpayer, such as a corporate executive, who
merely has administrative control over writers, actors, or artists, does not
create property by personal effort. Id.
S. REP. No. 81-2375, 43-44 (1950); see Chin-Chin Yap, Taxing the Artist Pension
Trust, 30 COLUM. J. L. & ARTs 197, 200 (2007) (discussing the rationale for the
enactment and the evolution of I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)).
I.R.C.

§§ 1(a)-(d), (i), 1221(a)(3)(A) (2012).

Id. §§ 1015(a), 1041(b)(2) (2012). The basis of the art received by the donee or
transferee is a transferred basis from the artist. Id.

'6

I.R.C.

367

Id.

§§ 1(a)-(d), (i), 1015(a), 1221(a)(3)(B).

§§ 1(a)- (d), (h), (i), 1014(a), 1221(a).
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"Inventory"3 68 and "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" are also excluded from
the definition of a capital asset. 9 As a result, the business of selling property will
generate ordinary income, which will be taxed at regular progressive rates.370 The
Supreme Court recognized the necessity of this exception in stating, "[t]he
purpose of the statutory provision [I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)] with which we deal is to
differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising from the everyday operation
of a business' on the one hand .

.

. and 'the realization of appreciation in value

accrued over a substantial period of time' on the other."37' Thus the artist and art
dealer who are in the business of selling art will receive ordinary income
treatment on the disposition of art while the investor who holds art primarily for
appreciation in value will enjoy capital gains treatment on the sale or exchange of
art.37 2 With regard to art held for multiple purposes, the Supreme Court defined
"primarily" to mean "principally" or "of first importance."373
Finally, depreciable property and real property used in a business are
excluded from the definition of a capital asset and will produce ordinary income
upon disposition.37 4 But if the property is held for more than one year, I.R.C.
§ 1231 will determine the character of any gain or loss on the disposition of
depreciable business property.375 Generally, if the taxpayer's gains exceed losses,
the gains and losses are characterized as long-term capital gains and losses under

**

Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (2014) (noting that inventory accounting must be used
whenever "production, purchase, or sale of merchandise is an income
producing factor").

36

I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1).

370

Id.

371

Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966).

372

See Yap, supra note 363, at 200 (arguing the inequities of taxing an artist at
ordinary income rates while allowing art investors preferential capital gains
rates).

3

Malat, 383 U.S. 569 at 572. (stating, for example, an art dealer may hold
particular works of art for appreciation in value); see supra text
accompanying notes 227-331 (listing the factors considered in determining
whether an art dealer holds particular works of art as an investment).

7

I.R.C.

37

§§

1(a), (i), 61(a)(2).

§ 1221(a)(2)

(2012).

Id. §§ 1231(a)(1), (b)(1).
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§ 1231.376 The question of the whether art acquired by a business collector
for display in offices or other business premises is depreciable has not been
resolved. 3 7 If the business art is determined to be non-depreciable, the art is a
capital asset, and the sale of the art will produce capital gains. 3 78
I.R.C.

The importance of characterization extends beyond the rate at which
gain will be taxed to the amount of a charitable contribution deduction.379
Generally, if property is contributed to a charity, the amount of the charitable
contribution deduction is the fair market value of the property donated.W But
I.R.C. § 170(e) provides that if appreciated art is donated to a charity, the amount
of any charitable contribution is reduced by the amount of gain that would not
have been characterized as long-term capital gain if the property had been
sold.38' Thus the taxpayer who is an artist or art dealer is limited to the cost of the
art as the amount of a charitable donation because the sale of the art would have
produced ordinary income.382 Even if a collector or investor holds the art, the
amount of a charitable donation is limited to the cost if the art was held for a year
or less because the sale would have produced short-term capital gain.3 83

Even if the hypothetical sale of art would have produced long-term
capital gain, the charitable contribution deduction of the collector or investor is
limited to the cost of the art if the use by the charity is unrelated to its exempt

376

Id.

§ 1231(a)(1), (2) (but if the taxpayer's losses exceed gains, the gains and

losses are ordinary gains and losses).
37

See infra Part III.C. (analyzing the allowability of depreciation deductions for
business art).

378

I.R.C.

§ 1221(a) (The business art will not fall within any of the exceptions to

the definition of a capital asset).
3

PEARSON LIDDELL & JANETTE WILSON, INDIVIDUAL NONCASH CONTRIBUTIONS,

2011 112 (2014). In 2011, individual taxpayers reported $867,350,000 in
charitable contribution deductions, on Form 8283 Noncash Charitable
Contributions, for donations of art and collectibles. See id.

§ 170 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (2014).

3o

I.R.C.

381

I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A).

382

-3

Id.; see Douglas J. Bell, ChangingI.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) for Art's Sake, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 536, 540-41 (arguing the inequities of limiting an artist's
charitable contribution deduction to the cost of materials while allowing art
collectors a deduction equal to fair market value).
I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A); see also Bell, supra note 382, at 540-41.
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purposes or functions& The Treasury Regulations provide as an example of
related use the donation of a painting to an educational institution for display in
a library or for study by art students 5 But if the educational institution sells the
painting, even if the proceeds from the sale are used for educational purposes,
the use by the educational institution is considered unrelated use.386 The
deduction at full value may be preserved if the taxpayer establishes that, at the
time of the donation, it was reasonable to believe that the art would not be put to
an unrelated use.3 87 For example, unless the taxpayer has actual knowledge to the
contrary, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to believe that an object of art donated
to a museum would not be sold if the art object were the type generally retained
by the museum.3m
C.

The Depreciation of Art

Similar to other deductions for expenses incurred in an activity for profit,
the function of a depreciation deduction is to allow the taxpayer to recover the
cost of property exhausted in the process of generating income.389 But the
depreciation deduction is allowed over a period of years rather than in the
current tax year. 390 Its function is not to reflect the actual decline in the value of
wasting property, 391 but is a method of matching the cost of property with
income generated by the use of the property in a business or for profit activity. 392
IR.C. § 167(a) allows as a depreciation deduction "a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance

38

I.R.C.

385

§ 170(e)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2012).

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(i) (2014). A further example of related use is the
contribution of furnishings to a charitable organization used by the
charitable organization in its offices and buildings in the course of carrying
out its functions. Id.

386

Id.

387

Id.

388

Id.

38

BITTKER ET AL.,

§ 1.170A-4(b)(3)(ii)(b).
supra note 175,

1 14.01.

o90Id.; see I.R.C. § 179 (permitting a taxpayer to deduct, up to a dollar limitation,
the cost of tangible personal property purchased for use in an active
business).
391

Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (2014).

392

BITrKER, ET AL.,

supra note 175, 114.01.
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for obsolescence) -(1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of
property held for the production of income."393 Since 1981, the rules for
determining the amount of the depreciation deduction allowed for tangible
property under the accelerated cost recovery system ("ACRS") are provided in
I.R.C. § 168.394 Because only property used in a trade or business or held for the
production of income are depreciable, personal use assets, such as objects of art
held for personal pleasure, are not depreciable. 395 In addition, inventory and
property held primarily for sale are not depreciable; therefore, inventory held by
an artist or an art dealer is not depreciable.39 6 An unanswered question is
whether the business collector may depreciate art that is acquired for display or
decoration on the business premises.39 7
In the case of tangible property, the depreciation allowance applies only
if the property is "subject to wear and tear, to decay or decline from natural
causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence."398 Unfortunately, the I.R.C. or the
Treasury Regulations do not define what constitutes wear and tear, exhaustion,
and obsolescence. 39 Arguably, objects of art hanging on a wall or sitting on a
shelf or floor for display do not suffer wear and tear.4 00 Nevertheless, all objects
of art-no matter how extensively preserved or protected -deteriorate over

39

I.R.C. §167(a) (2012). The basis of property is decreased to reflect the
recovery of the cost of the property through depreciation deductions. Id.

394

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 201, 203. ACRS
was enacted in 1981 and substantially modified in 1986. Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201.

39

396

I.R.C. § 167(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (2014); Prop. Treas. Reg.
1.168-3(a)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (2014); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-3(a)(1).

§

39

Art used in the trade or business of the taxpayer is art "devoted to the trade
or business." Alamo Broad. Co. v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 534, 541 (1950) (internal
citations omitted).

398

Treas. Reg.

39

Anthony S. Bakale, Is Office Artwork Depreciable Property?, AICPA
(Aug. 1, 2012), availableat http://www.grossbachcpa.com/1854.

40

Id.

§ 1.167(a)-2 (2014); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-3(a)(1).
INSIGHTS

2015

Taxation of Artists & the Acquirers of Art

127

time. 401 If art is displayed at an open business location, the taxpayer should be
able to establish that the art is subject to significant wear and tear. 4 02
In Selig v. Commissioner,03 the taxpayers were in the business of
exhibiting "exotic automobiles" to the public for an admissions fee. 4"

The

automobiles were state-of-the-art, high technology vehicles with unique design
features or equipment.405 The U.S. Tax Court held that the automobiles were
subject to obsolescence and, therefore, were subject to an allowance for
depreciation.0 6 Although finding the precise useful life of the exotic automobiles
was determined to be unnecessary, explicit in the finding of the Tax Court was
the fact that "the exotic automobiles were not museum pieces of indeterminable
useful life." 407
Determining the useful life of art is very difficult. 4 08 Prior to ACRS,

taxpayers were required to determine the useful life4 9 of the property before a
depreciation deduction was allowed. The Treasury Regulations state, "the
estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life inherent in the
asset but the period over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be
useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production of his
income." 410 The Secretary of the Treasury has consistently taken the position that
works of art held for use in a business or for investment are not depreciable
401

Id.

402

Id.

40

Selig v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1125 (1995).

4

Id. at 1.

4

Id. at 2.

4

Id. at 5.

40

Id.

4

William M. Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasersof Art, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 214, 261 (1980).

40

Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a), (b) (2014). Taxpayers could not depreciate
property below a reasonable salvage value. Id. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (2014). The
term "salvage value" is the estimated amount that would be realized upon
the disposition of an asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade
or business or in the production of the taxpayer's income. Id. § 1.167(a)-1(c).
(2014) Post-ACRS, the salvage value of property is treated as zero. I.R.C. §
168(b)(4) (2012).

410

Treas. Reg.

§ 1.167(a)-1(b).

128
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because works of art do not have a determinable useful life. 411 Revenue Ruling
68-232 states as follows:
A valuable and treasured art piece does not have a determinable
useful life. While the actual physical condition of the property
may influence the value placed on the object, it will not
ordinarily limit or determine the useful life. Accordingly,
depreciation of works of art generally is not allowable. 412
In a pre-ACRS, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case,
413
Associated Obstetricians and Gynecologist, P.C. v. Commissioner,
the taxpayer
moved into new offices, and its office manager purchased several works of art to
decorate the office space. 414 The art was purchased solely to complement the
d~cor. 415 Because the taxpayer could not establish that the art had a determinable
useful life, the Tax Court held the art was not subject to an allowance for
depreciation. 416 Nevertheless, the Tax Court noted that the paintings "were more
wall decorations than works of art" and stated that the paintings would be
depreciable if the taxpayer established the economic useful life.417 In Hawkins v.
Commissioner,418 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a
taxpayer who purchased art for display in his law office could not take a
depreciation deduction because the taxpayer could not demonstrate that the art
had a determinable useful life.419 In Thompson v. United States, applying Revenue
Ruling 68-232, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
that the taxpayer could not depreciate paintings hung in his restaurant because

411

Rev. Rul. 1968-1 C.B. 79.

412

Id.

413

Associated Obstetricians & Gynecologist, P.C. v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH)
613 (1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1985).

414

Id. at 613-14.

415

Id. at 614.

416

Id.

417

Id.

418

Hawkins v. Comm'r, 713 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1983).

419

Id. at 354. Under ACRS, the salvage value of an asset is treated as zero. I.R.C.
§ 168(b)(45).
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the taxpayer did not establish a realistic useful life or produce evidence of
physical wear and tear. 42 0
In two post-ACRS cases involving antique musical instruments, the
circuit courts allowed the taxpayers, who were professional musicians, to take
depreciation deductions even though the taxpayers could not prove a
determinable useful life for the instruments and even though the instruments
were likely to increase in value as collectibles. 42 1 The case decided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Simon v. Commissioner, involved
nineteenth century violin bows created by Francois Tourte, 422 and the case
decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Liddle v. Commissioner,
involved a seventeenth century Ruggeri bass viol. 423 In both cases, the Tax Court
found that the taxpayers proved the instruments suffered substantial wear and
tear through regular, active, and physical use within the taxpayers' profession. 424
The Tax Court decisions created a test for determining whether tangible property
is depreciable: (1) the property must be a business or investment asset, and (2)
the taxpayer must prove that the property is subject to exhaustion, wear and tear,
or obsolescence.425
On appeal, the Second Circuit4 26 and Third Circuit 4 2 7 affirmed the

decisions of the Tax Court. 428 The circuit courts held that the depreciation of the

420

Thompson Co. v. U.S., 338 F. Supp. 770, 779 (N.D. Ill. 1971). See Judge v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1264 (1976) (holding that the paintings displayed
in the taxpayer's offices, which were painted by unknown artists and not of
the kind ordinarily considered "valuable and treasured" works of art, were
not depreciable as the taxpayer did not establish an economic useful life);
Harrah's Club v. United States, 661 F.2d 203, 209 (Fed. Cl. 1981) (denying
depreciation deductions for restored cars with indefinite lives, which do not
deteriorate over time or lessen in value); see also Henderson v. Comm'r, 46
T.C.M. (CCH) 566 (1983) (denying a deduction for the cost of a framed print
and live plant used by the taxpayer, a government employee, to furnish her
office as an ordinary and necessary business expense under I.R.C. § 162(a)).

421

BITTKER ET AL.,

4

Simon v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 41, 41 (2d Cir. 1995).

423

Liddle v. Comm'r, 65 F.3d 329, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).

424

Simon, 68 F.3d at 44; Liddle, 65 F.3d at 335.

2

426

supra note 175, ¶[ 14.04[3].

Alton A. Murakami, "Useful Life' has Outlived its Useful Life: Tax Depreciation
after Simon and Liddle, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211, 1221 (1997).
Simon, 68 F.3d at 47.
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instruments was governed by ACRS and the two-pronged test established by the
Tax Court.4 2 9 As tools of the trade and not works of art,3 0 the taxpayers were not
required to establish a determinable useful life for the instruments, 431 but only
that the instruments were used by the taxpayers in their business and subject to
substantial wear and tear. 4 32 The circuit courts noted that the requirement that
the asset suffer wear and tear distinguishes these cases from cases involving
many other forms of art. 43 ' The Second Circuit stated, "[flor example, paintings
that hang on the wall of a law firm merely to be looked at -to please connoisseur
clients or to give the appearance of dignity to combative professionals -do not
generally suffer wear or tear." 4M
After the Simon and Liddle decisions, uncertainty continues as to the
validity of the determinable-useful-life requirement. 435 The Secretary of the

4

Liddle, 65 F.3d at 335.

4

Murakami, supra note 425, at 1221 (arguing that Simon and Liddle were
wrongly decided, as ACRS did not eliminate the determinable useful life
requirement, but reached the correct result and that legislation should be
enacted to provide certainty).

429

Simon, 103 T.C. 247 (1994), aff'd, 68 F.3d at 43; Liddle, 103 T.C. 285 (1994), aff'd,
65 F.3d at 334-35.

43

Liddle, 65 F.3d at 335.

431

Simon, 68 F.3d at 46; Liddle, 65 F.3d at 335.

432

Murakami, supra note 425, at 1222-23 (1997).

433

Simon, 68 F.3d at 44; Liddle, 65 F.3d at 335.

43

Simon, 68 F.3d at 44.

435

Murakami, supra note 425, at 1222-23 (1997); see Selig v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1125, 1125 (1995) (allowing a depreciation deduction with respect to
exotic, state-of-the-art, high technology vehicles exhibited by the taxpayer
because the automobiles were subject to obsolescence even though the
precise useful life of the automobiles was not determined); Browning v.
Comm'r, 890 F.2d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying a depreciation
deduction to a professional musician for three antique violins as the
taxpayer failed to present sufficient evidence as to the useful life of the
violins); Clinger v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 598 (1990) (holding, prior to
the Simon and Liddle decisions, that a painting hung in the taxpayer's studio
for educational and promotional reasons was not depreciable as the
taxpayer did not establish a determinable useful life). See supra note 425, at
1222-39 (1997) (arguing that the depreciation deduction sought in Clinger
would have been allowed after Simon and Liddle).
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Treasury issued an Action on Decision, rejecting the Simon and Liddle holdings,
and expounding the following: although the Tax Court qualified instruments as
"recovery property" because they were subject to substantial wear and tear, and
were used regularly in taxpayers' trade, ACRS was enacted to shorten the
recovery period over which assets are depreciated, and not to convert previously
non-depreciable assets into depreciable assets or to diverge from the concept that
to be entitled to depreciation, property has to have a determinable useful life. 43
Further, Proposed Treasury Regulations specifically state that ACRS does not
437
apply to "works of art."

In Technical Advise Memorandum ("TAM") 199927011, the Secretary of
the Treasury interpreted the term "property subject to the allowance for
depreciation" to impose three requirements: (1) the property must be subject to
exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence; (2) the property must be used over a
period of years; and (3) the property must be used in a trade or business or held
for the production of income. 38 Citing the opinions of the Tax Court in Simon
and Liddle, the Secretary of the Treasury stated further that the term means
"property subject to exhaustion or wear and tear, decay, decline or exhaustion,
and used in a taxpayer's trade or business." 439 Arguably, some business art falls
within the asset class of office furniture with a ten-year class life and a seven-year
recovery period pursuant to Revenue Procedure 87-56.4o With the recent case
law and the TAM 199927011, the law has seemingly become more favorable to
the taxpayer. Nevertheless, the I.R.S. will most likely continue to adhere to
Revenue Ruling 68-232 and disallow a depreciation deduction for business art,
particularly if the artwork is costly.4 34

436

Simon v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995), action on dec., 1996-009.

4

Prop. Treas. Reg.

4

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 199927001 (July 9, 1999).

439

Id.

140

"

§ 1.168-3(a)(1).

Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674 as modified and clarified by Rev. Proc. 8822, 1988-1 C.B. 785.
Bakale, supra note 399; see Audit Technique Guide, supra note 8, ch. 3 (stating
that "a business collector does not buy the art for resale but rather for
purposes such as office display or decoration in the ordinary course of trade
or business. Art because the useful life is not determinable is generally not
subject to depreciation.").
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The Involuntary Conversion of Art

Congress enacted I.R.C. § 1033 in 1921.442 The purpose of § 1033 is to
relieve the taxpayer from unanticipated tax liability arising from the involuntary
conversion of property to the extent the taxpayer reinvests the proceeds within
the period provided by the statute."3 The Tax Court articulated this in Willamette
Indus. Inc. v. Comm'r:
The statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish this
purpose. On the other hand, it was not intended to confer a
gratuitous benefit upon the taxpayer by permitting him to utilize
the involuntary interruption in the continuity of his investment
to alter the nature of that investment tax free . . . .4
I.R.C. § 1033 is a provision that allows for the non-recognition of gain
upon the involuntary conversion of property "as a result of its destruction in
whole or in part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or
imminence thereof."" 5 Awards received for the destruction of property by
casualty or theft or the requisition or condemnation of property is treated as the
amount realized from the disposition of the property." 6 Absent I.R.C. § 1033,
gain would be realized and recognized on the involuntary conversion of
property to the extent the amount realized exceeds the basis of the converted
property." 7

442

Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 214(a)(12), 234(a)(14), 42 Stat. 227, 241-42,
257. In 1942, Congress excluded losses from the nonrecognition rule of I.R.C.
section 1033. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2
C.B. 504, 595.
Willamette Indus. Inc. v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 126, 131 (2002) (citing Filippini v.
United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1963)).

44

Id.

44

I.R.C.

46

447

§ 1033(a) (2012).

BITrKER ET AL., supra note 175, 1 28.04[4]. Except as otherwise provided, the
entire amount of realized gain or loss is recognized. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2012);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (2007).

I.R.C. § 1001; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a). A loss is sustained to the extent the
basis of the converted property exceeds the amount realized. I.R.C. § 1001;
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a).
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Pursuant to I.R.C. § 1033, the taxpayer may elect not to recognize the
gain realized on an involuntary conversion." 8 Nevertheless, realized gain is
recognized to the extent that the amount received on the conversion exceeds the
cost of the replacement property that is "similar or related in service or use to the
property so converted."" 9 Generally the replacement period begins on the date of
the destruction or theft of the property and ends two years after the close of the
first tax year in which any part of the gain on the conversion is realized.450 The
basis of the replacement property is the amount paid for the property minus any
unrecognized gain, thus, merely deferring the gain not recognized. 451
Example: Taxpayer is an artist whose art studio was totally
destroyed in a fire of unknown origin. The art studio had a basis
of $200,000. Within three months of the fire, Taxpayer received
$500,000 in insurance proceeds for the destruction of the art
studio. Taxpayer immediately hired an architect and a contractor
to construct a replacement art studio at the same location. Within
twelve months of the fire, the replacement art studio was
completed at a cost of $600,000. The replacement art studio
qualifies as similar or related in service or use to the converted
art studio. Although Taxpayer realized gain of $300,000
($500,000 insurance proceeds minus $200,000 basis) as a result of

48

"

450
451

I.R.C. §1033(a)(2). I.R.C. § 1033 is elective if the property is converted into
money. Id. § 1033(a)(2)(A). But I.R.C. §1033 is mandatory if property is
converted directly into property similar or related in service or use; in which
case, the basis of the replacement property is the basis of the converted
property increased by recognized gain. Id. § 1033(a)(1), (b)(1).
Id. § 1033(a)(2)(A). In the alternative, the taxpayer can acquire control of a
corporation holding property similar or related in service or use to the
converted property. Id. § 1033(a)(2)(A). The term "control" means ownership
of stock with at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of
voting stock and at least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(E)(i). Generally, the corporation must reduce the
both the basis of the stock and the replacement property by the
unrecognized gain. Id. § 1033(b)(3). Generally, the replacement property or
the stock cannot be acquired from a related person if the gain realized on the
involuntary conversion exceeds $100,000. Id. § 1033(i).
Id. § 1033(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 1033(b)(2); see I.R.C. § 1223(1) (2006) (tacking the holding period of the
property relinquished onto the holding period of the property received for
the purposes of the characterization of capital gains and capital losses).
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the fire, Taxpayer will not recognize any gain, as Taxpayer
reinvested the entire $500,000, plus an additional $100,000,
constructing the replacement art studio. The basis of the new art
studio is $300,000 (cost of the replacement studio $600,000 minus
unrecognized gain of $300,000). If Taxpayer invested only
$400,000 of the insurance proceeds in constructing the
replacement art studio, Taxpayer will recognize $100,000 of the
$300,000 gain realized ($500,000 insurance proceeds minus
$400,000 cost of the replacement studio). The basis of the new art
studio is $200,000 ($400,000 cost of the replacement studio minus
the unrecognized gain of $200,000).
I.R.C. § 1033 applies to the involuntary conversion of personal use
property as well as property held for use in a trade or business or for the
production of income. 452 The property must be "compulsorily or involuntarily
converted" as a result of its "destruction in whole or in part, theft, seizure, or
requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof." 453 An involuntary
conversion, within the meaning of I.R.C. § 1033, requires that the taxpayer's
property is no longer useful or available to the taxpayer due to some outside
force or agency.4 5 The term "destruction" is equivalent to "casualty" in the sense
of I.R.C. § 165(c)(3),1 55 which allows an individual a loss deduction with respect
to personal-use asset only if the loss arises from "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty or from theft."4 56 For the purposes of a loss deduction, the term
"casualty" is defined as an accident, mishap, or sudden invasion by a hostile
agency;4 5 7 but as long as the causes of the destruction fall within the general

concept of a casualty, the destruction does not have to be sudden for purposes of
establishing an involuntary conversion under I.R.C. § 1033.4ss But the sale of

452

BURKE & FRIEL, supra

45

I.R.C.

4

C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 468, 476 (1964).

45

Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200.

45

I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2012). See infra text accompanying notes 495-506
(discussing the meaning of the phrase "from fire, storm, shipwreck, and
other casualty, or from theft" for the purposes of I.R.C. § 165(c)(3)).

457

Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200 (noting that the term "casualty" excludes
the progressive deterioration of property through a steadily operating
cause).

458

Id.

note 102, at 966.

§ 1033(a).
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repairable or reusable property that was damaged as the result of a casualty does
not constitute an involuntary conversion under I.R.C. § 1033.459
In additional to a casualty, I.R.C.

§ 1033 also applies to a "theft, seizure,

4
or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof." 6 The term

"theft" has been interpreted broadly to include any criminal taking of property,
including theft by "swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of guile." 61
The term "seizure" means confiscation of property by a governmental agency
without compensation, and the term "requisition or condenation" means
taking of property by a governmental agency for public use with
compensation. 462 Finally, the phrase "threat or imminence thereof" requires that
the property owner be informed, orally or in writing, of the decision of the
governmental agency to acquire the property for public use.46 The property
owner must reasonably believe that the property will be condemned if a
*

voluntary sale does not take place.

Special treatment is given to principal residences465 located in disaster
areas that are compulsorily or involuntarily converted as the result of a federally
declared disaster.6 6 No gain is recognized on the receipt of insurance proceeds
for personal property that was part of the contents of the residence if the contents

41

C.G. Willis, Inc., 41 T.C. at 474-75.

4s

I.R.C. § 1033(a) (2012).

461

Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956).

462

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 101460-00 (June 29, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
124954-06 (Nov. 11, 2006).

46

Rev. Rul. 74-8, 1974-1 C.B. 200.

4

Id.

45

6

I.R.C. §,1033(h)(4) (stating the term "principal residence" has the same
meaning as used in I.R.C. § 121 (exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal
residence) except that the term includes a residence not treated as a principle
residence under I.R.C. § 121 solely because the taxpayer does not own the
property).
Id. § 1033(h)(1). The term "federally declared disaster" means any disaster
determined by the President to warrant assistance by the U.S. government.

Id.

§ 1033(h)(3), § 165(h)(3)(C)(i). If the property of the taxpayer is held for

use in a business or for investment is compulsorily or involuntarily
converted as a result of a federally declared disaster, tangible property of a
type held for use in a business is treated as property similar or related in
service or use. Id. § 1033(h)(2).
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were not scheduled under the insurance policy. 467 Any insurance proceeds
received for the principal residence and scheduled contents may be treated as a
common pool of funds. As a common pool, at the election of the taxpayer, gain is
recognized only to the extent that the common pool exceeds the cost.of the
replacement property similar or related in service or use. 68
Example: Taxpayer's principal residence and its contents were
damaged by fire, and the area in which the residence was
located was declared a federal disaster area. The cost of the
residence was $700,000 and the cost of the scheduled contents,
three paintings, was $100,000. Taxpayer received $850,000 in
insurance proceeds for the residence and $150,000 in insurance
proceeds for the paintings. In addition, Taxpayer received
$500,000 in insurance proceeds for the unscheduled contents of
the residence. Taxpayer will not recognize gain with respect to
the $500,000 received for the unscheduled contents. The common
pool of funds is $1,000,000 ($850,000 for the residence and
$150,000 for the paintings). Taxpayer used $950,000 from the
common pool to purchase a replacement residence, but did not
replace the paintings. Of the realized gain of $200,000 ($1,000,000
common pool minus $700,000 cost of the residence and $100,000
cost of the paintings), under I.R.C. section 1033, Taxpayer may
elect to recognize only $50,000 gain ($1,000,000 common pool
minus $950,000 cost of the replacement residence).
To assure the continuation of investment as intended by Congress,469
I.R.C. § 1033 requires that the replacement property must be "similar or related
in service or use" to the converted property. 470 Although neither the I.R.C. nor
the Treasury Regulations defines the meaning of the term "similar or related in
service or use," 471 the Secretary of the Treasury and circuit court decisions have

-

468

469

§ 1033(h)(1)(A)(i). The replacement period is extended from two years
to four years. Id. §§ 1033(a)(2)(B), 1033(h)(1)(B).
I.R.C.

Id. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii), § 1033(a)(2)(A).
James A. Barnes & Jonathan A. Small, Tax Treatment of
Condemnation
Proceeds: An Analysis and Some Proposals For Reform, 4 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 325,
334-35 (1967).

§ 1033(a)(2)(A).

470

I.R.C.

471

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200411001 (Mar. 12, 2004).
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developed two tests: (1) the functional test, and (2) the investor test.4 72 The
functional test looks to the functional similarities of the properties, requiring the
physical characteristics and end uses of the converted and replacement
properties to be closely similar.4 73 The investor test focuses on the extent and type
of the lessor's management activity, the amount and kind of services rendered by
the lessor to the tenants, and the nature of the business risks connected with the
properties. 474
With regard to the involuntary conversion of art, little authority exists as
to what constitutes property similar or related in service or use. Private Letter
Ruling 8127089475 involved an art collection consisting of approximately 3,000
lithographs, which was damaged by fire. 4 7 6 The art collection also included oil
paintings, pencil drawings, sculptures, masks, woodcarvings, and block prints. 4 7 7
Almost all of the insurance proceeds paid to the taxpayers were to compensate
for the damage to the lithographs, with less than 1% of the proceeds to
compensate for the damage of the other objects of art. 478 As the taxpayers were
experiencing difficulty with the restoration of the lithographs, they considered
buying replacement art.4 7 9 The taxpayers proposed using the insurance proceeds
to purchase replacement art, which would consist of approximately 63%
lithographs, and 37% art in other artistic media, such as oil paintings,
watercolors, sculptures, or other graphic forms of art.480 The Secretary of the
Treasury concluded as follows:
The Internal Revenue Service will not consider as property
similar or related in service or use, art work in one medium,
destroyed in whole or in part, replaced with art work in another
medium. Therefore, in order to qualify for complete

472

Liant Record, Inc. v. Comm'r, 303 F.2d 326, 328-39 (2d Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul.
64-237, 164-2 C.B. 319.

47

Liant Record, Inc., 303 F.2d at 328; Rev. Rul. 64-237, 164-2 C.B. 319.

474

Id.

475

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089 (Apr. 10, 1981).

476

Id.

n

Id.

478

Id.

47

Id.

480

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089.
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nonrecognition of gain under section 1033(a), you must purchase
the same percentage of lithographs as were destroyed in whole
or in part and the same percentage of artworks in other artistic
media as were destroyed in whole or in part.481
In 1993, the Secretary of the Treasury responded to tax questions raised
by the victims of Hurricane Andrew in a Field Service Advisory. 482 One of the
questions submitted was whether the replacement of an acrylic painting, held for
investment, with an oil painting, to be held for investment, qualified as property
similar or related in service or use.48 3 In applying the investor test, the Secretary
of the Treasury considered the similarity in the service or use of the converted
and replacement property to the investor, examining the nature of the business
risk and, if applicable, the demands on the taxpayer by way of management and
services.48 Noting Private Letter Ruling 8127089,485 the Secretary of the Treasury
concluded that the use of different types of paint, for example, acrylic versus oil,
generally will not cause two paintings held for investment to fail the similar or
related in service, or use requirement of I.R.C.

§ 1033.46

If the involuntary conversion results in a loss, the issue becomes whether
the loss is a deductible loss under I.R.C. § 165. Generally, I.R.C. § 165 allows a
loss deduction for any loss sustained during the tax year and not otherwise
compensated for by insurance.487 The amount of the loss deduction is determined
by the adjusted basis of the property as provided in § 1011.4 A loss is treated as
sustained in the tax year in which the loss occurs "as evidenced by closed and
completed transactions and as fixed by identifiable events occurring in such

481

Id.

482

F.S.A. 1993 WL 1609185 (Apr. 15, 1993).

483

Id.

4

Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319). Alternatively, the functional test
requires, as to the owner-user of the property, that the converted and
replacement property have a close functional similarity, examining whether
the physical characteristics and end uses are closely similar. Id. (citing Rev.
Rul. 71-575, 1971-2 C.B. 61; Rev. Rul. 77-192, 1977-1 C.B. 249).

485

See supra text accompanying notes 476-82 (examining the facts and holding
of Private Letter Ruling 8127089).

46

F.S.A. 1993 WL 1609185 (Apr. 15, 1993).

48

I.R.C.
Id.

§ 165(a) (2006).

§ 165(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c)(1) (1977).
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taxable year."4 8 9 A loss arising from theft is treated as sustained in the tax year in

which the theft is discovered.4 9 If the loss occurs in a disaster area and is
attributable to a federally declared disaster, at the election of the taxpayer, the
loss may be taken into account in the preceding tax year.49 1 If a reasonable claim
for reimbursement exists in the tax year of the casualty or theft, a loss is not
sustained until it is determined with reasonable certainty whether or not
reimbursement will be received. 492
For an individual, loss deductions are limited to losses incurred in a
trade or business or transactions entered into for profit. 493 For personal-use
assets, losses are limited to those arising from "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft." 4 94 The term "casualty" is defined as an accident, mishap,
or sudden invasion by a hostile agency, excluding progressive deterioration of
property through a steadily operating cause. 495 The I.R.S. describes the term as
follows:
The courts have consistently upheld the Internal Revenue
Service position that an "other casualty" is limited to casualties
analogous to fire, storm, or shipwreck. The Service position has
been that a casualty is the complete or partial destruction of
property resulting from an identifiable event of a sudden,
unexpected, and unusual nature. 496
Thus, according to both the I.R.S. and the courts, no loss deduction is allowed for
the mysterious disappearance of property, absent evidence of a theft.497 But a
deduction is allowed for property accidently and irretrievably lost as the result of

489

Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(1).

490

I.R.C. § 165(e).

491

Id.

492

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-1(d)(2), 1.165-8(a)(2).

49

I.R.C. §165(c)(1), (2).

494

Id. § 165(c)(3).

"

Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200. (citing Fay v. Helvering, 120 F.2d 253, 253

496
47

§ 165(i).

(2d Cir. 1941)).
Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101.
See Allen v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 163, 166 (1951).
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an event that qualifies as a casualty, 98 for example, a sculpture lost in the rubble
left by an earthquake.
A theft is the unlawful taking of money or property of another, including
by swindle, false pretenses, larceny, embezzlement, and robbery. 499 To claim a
theft loss, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the evidence supports a
reasonable inference that the loss was the result of a theft.m In Kramer v. United
States,"o' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the taxpayer
was not entitled to deduct a loss for the purchase of two falsely attributed
paintings: one of which had a forged signature and the other of which was not
painted by the artist to whom it was attributed. 502 As to both paintings, the
taxpayer failed to prove that the art dealer who sold the paintings to the taxpayer
defrauded the taxpayer by knowingly and intentionally misattributing the
paintings.503 The court observed that even experts have difficulty determining
whether a painting is genuine, and found that the mere existence of a forged
signature was insufficient to prove theft by false pretenses.5 4 The court also
ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the paintings did not
evidence the art dealer's intent to defraud the taxpayer.W 5
Bonnie Magness-Gardiner, Art Theft Program Manager for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, recently stated:
Art theft . . . it's hard to characterize the problem absolutely
because we don't really have very good statistics. Not all art
thefts are reported. Many art thefts are actually lootings from
either institutions or from archaeological sites, sometimes from
churches . . . . That being said, however, it's estimated that it's
between $4 and 6 billion worldwide every year. And much of

498

White v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 430, 437-38 (1967); Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B.
101.

499

Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1956); Treas. Reg. §
1.165-8(d).

50o Allen, 16 T.C. at 166.
so1

Krahmer v. United States, 810 F.2d 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

502

Id. at 1146, 1147-48.

50

Id. at 1147.

54

Id.

5s

Id.; Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972 C.B. 101.
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that stolen art actually ends up in the United States because we
are a market for art. . . . In the U.S., the problem usually centers
around residential burglaries for private collections.26
The computation of the amount of a casualty or theft loss begins with the
lesser of the reduction in value of the property or the basis of the property.5 7 But,
if property used in a business or transaction entered into for profit is totally
destroyed, and the basis of the property is greater than the value immediately
before the casualty or theft, then the amount of the loss is the basis of the
property.50 8 Two methods can be employed to determine the decline in value of
the property: (1) the appraised value of the damaged property immediately
before and immediately after the casualty, and (2) the cost of repairs to the
damaged property.5> In the case of a theft, the value of the property after the
theft is considered zero.510 The basis of the damaged property is reduced by the
allowable loss deduction, and increased by amounts spent to restore the
property.511
With regard to personal-use assets, the amount of deductible losses is
further limited. 512 Personal casualty and theft losses are subject to a
nondeductible $100 floor, and are deductible for the taxable year only to the
extent of personal casualty gains, 5 1 3 plus the excess personal casualty losses that

exceed ten percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.514

506

FBI Art

Theft

Program, THE

FEDERAL

BUREAU

http://www.fbi.gov/news/videos/fbi-art-theft-program

OF

INVESTIGATION,

(last visited Jan. 2,

507

2015).
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1)-8(c) (1977).

508

Id.

109

Id. § 1.165-7(a)(2).

510

Id. § 1.165-8(c).

11

I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1) (2006).

512

See id. § 165(h).

s11

See generally id. § 165(h)(4) (defining the terms "personal casualty loss" and
"personal casualty gain" as any loss or gain arising from the casualty or theft
of personal-use property).

514

Id. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii). Only personal casualty losses up to the amount of
personal casualty gains are treated as deductions in computing adjusted
gross income. Id. § 165(h)(5)(A). The amounts by which the excess of
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Example: Taxpayer collects art for personal enjoyment.
Taxpayer's adjusted gross income is $100,000. During the tax
year, a sculpture was stolen from Taxpayer's home. The
sculpture was purchased for $20,000 with a value of $25,000. The
sculpture was uninsured and never recovered. During the same
tax year, a painting was completely destroyed in an automobile
accident while being transported by Taxpayer. The painting was
purchased for $10,000 with a value of $20,000, and Taxpayer
received $15,000 in insurance proceeds. As a result, Taxpayer
experienced a personal casualty loss with regard to the sculpture
of $19,900 (the lesser of the reduction in value of $25,000 or the
basis of $20,000, minus the $100 floor) and a personal casualty
gain of $5,000 ($15,000 in insurance proceeds minus the $10,000
basis (the lesser of the reduction in value of $20,000 or the basis
of $10,000)). Thus, Taxpayer's allowable personal casualty loss
deduction is $9,900 ($5,000 to the extent of the personal casualty
gains plus $4,900 (the excess of $14,900 minus $10,000 ($100,000
adjusted gross income x 10%)).
The character of casualty and theft gains and losses depends on the
taxpayer's relationship to the property515 If the individual, whether an artist or
art dealer, is in the business of selling art as inventory, the art is a noncapital
asset and a disposition results in ordinary gain or loss.5 16 Similarly, art is a

noncapital asset if held by the artist who created the art5 17 or by a business
collector, and, assuming that the art is depreciable,518 a disposition again results
in ordinary gain or loss. 19 Finally, a casualty or theft does not constitute a sale or

516

personal casualty losses over gains exceeds ten percent of adjusted gross
income are itemized deductions. Id. § 63(d). The term "adjusted gross
income" is defined as the gross income of an individual minus the otherwise
allowable deductions listed under section 62(a). Id. § 62.
See supra Part II.B. (discussing the characterization and tax treatment of
gains and losses on the disposition of art).
See I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1222(1)-(4).

517

Id.

518

Id. § 1221(a)(2). See supra Part III.C. (analyzing the deductibility of
depreciation for business art).

519

I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(2), 1222(1)-(4).

515

§ 1221(a)(3)(A).
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exchange of property. 520 As capital treatment requires the sale or exchange of a
capital asset, without statutory intervention, the casualty or theft of art produces
ordinary gain and loss. 5 2 1 Consequently, even though art is a capital asset, if it is
held by a collector who is a hobbyist, an investor, or in the art collection business,
and assuming that the art is non-depreciable, then the gains and losses from
casualty or theft are ordinary.522
Fortunately, the requirements for a sale or exchange of a capital asset are
"deemed" if the gains exceed the losses from the casualty or theft of personal-use
works of art, and the resulting gains and losses are treated as capital. 52 3 But, if the
losses exceed the gains from casualty or theft of personal-use art, then the gains
and losses are treated as ordinary. 52 4 If artwork is held for more than one year by
an investor or business collector as a non-personal use capital asset and
depreciable business property, and the losses equal or exceed the gains from the
casualty or theft of the art, then the gains and losses realized from the casualty or
theft also receive ordinary treatment. 52 5 On the other hand, if the casualty and
theft gains exceed the losses, and if those gains plus the gains from the sale of
depreciable business property held for more than one year exceed the losses,
then all of the gains and losses are deemed long-term capital gains and long-term
capital losses. 52 6 But, if the losses exceed the gains, then all of the gains and losses
are deemed ordinary gains and losses. 527
E.

The Exchange of Art

Generally, the disposition of art for valuable consideration results in the
realization and recognition of gain or loss.5 28 Whether the art is transferred in
exchange for money, property, services, rent, or any other form of economic
benefit, the amount of money and the value of the economic benefit received is

520

Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249-50 (1941)

521

See I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4).

5

Id. §§ 1221(a), 1222(l)-(4); Helvering, 313 U.S. at 249-50.

5

I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B).

524

Id. § 165(h)(2)(A).

525

Id. § 1231(a)(4)(C)-(b)(1).

527

Id. § 1231(a)(1), (3), (4)(C), (b)(1).
Id. § 1231(a)(2), (3), (4)(C), (b)(1).

528

I.R.C. § 1001(c).

526
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the amount realized on the exchange. 52 9 The exchange of art for art may result in
gain or loss because all works of art are unique, differing materially in kind or
extent.53 Thus, barter transactions involving the exchange of a painting for
another painting are taxable events. 31 Fortunately, I.R.C. § 1031 may provide for
the non-recognition of gain on an exchange of art if the requirements of the
section are met.5 3 2

Enacted in 1921, the same year as I.R.C. § 1033,533 I.R.C. § 1031 provides
for the non-recognition of gain or loss on the exchange of property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment solely for property of like
kind to be held for trade or business or investment purposes.5 - Unlike I.R.C.
§ 1033, I.R.C. § 1031 is not elective but mandatory.535 But if, in addition to likekind property, money or non-like-kind property (boot) is received on the
exchange, any realized gain is recognized to the extent of boot received.53 6
In 1934, Congress considered and rejected the repeal of the predecessor
to I.R.C. § 1031, justifying non-recognition as follows:

529

13

Id. §§ 61(a), 1001;(a)-(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a); Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1
C.B. 60.
Audit Technique Guide, supra note 8, ch. 3 (stating that, because an owner of an
artwork has a pecuniary interest in, and the right to sell, a unique piece of
property, trading artwork for artwork is an exchange of materially different
property). See Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 566 (1991);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a).

531

Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.

532

I.R.C.

53

§ 1031(a)(1).

Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921); see supra text
accompanying notes 443-87 (examining the requirements and application of
I.R.C. § 1033.).

5

I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1). I.R.C. § 1031 provides an exception to the general rule
that all realized gain or loss on the disposition of property is recognized. Id.
§ 1001(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(a)(1).

s3

I.R.C.

56

§§ 1031(a)(1), 1033(a)(2).

Id. § 1031(d). Nevertheless, if a loss is realized, the realized loss is not
recognized even though boot is received. Id. § 1031(c). The rationale for this
inconsistent treatment of gains and losses can be justified as the taxpayer's
original investment continues in the like-kind property received; therefore,
the transaction is not sufficiently closed to warrant a deduction. BITTKER ET
AL., supra note 175, 1 30.01[21).
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If the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same kind of
property as that in which it was originally invested, he is not
allowed to compute and deduct his theoretical loss on the
exchange, nor is he charged with a tax upon his theoretical
profit. The calculation of the profit or loss is deferred until it is
realized in cash, marketable securities, or other property not of
the same kind having a fair market value."'
As with other non-recognition provisions, I.R.C. § 1031 merely defers
recognition of realized gain and loss until the ultimate disposition of the
acquired property in a taxable exchange. 53 The mechanism for preserving
unrecognized gain or loss is basis.539 Although the basis of property acquired in a
taxable exchange is the value of the property received,O under I.R.C. § 1031, the
basis of the property received on the exchange is the basis of the property
relinquished, decreased by the amount of money received, and increased by the
amount of gain and decreased by the amount of loss recognized on the
exchange.-'
Example: Taxpayer exchanged a painting held for investment for
a replacement painting to be held for investment. The painting
relinquished had a value of $100,000 and a basis of $20,000, and
the replacement painting had a value of $100,000. As Taxpayer
received solely like-kind property in the exchange, Taxpayer will
not recognize the realized gain of $80,000 ($100,000 value of the
replacement painting minus the $20,000 basis of the relinquished
painting). Taxpayer's basis in the replacement painting is $20,000
($20,000 basis of the relinquished painting). However, if the
value of the replacement painting was $90,000 and Taxpayer also
received $10,000 cash (boot) in the exchange, Taxpayer will
recognize $10,000 of the realized gain of $80,000. Taxpayer's
basis in the replacement painting is $20,000 ($20,000 basis of the

1

H.R. REP. No. 73-704, 13 (1934).

538

BITTKER ET AL.,

539

Id.

,4

supra note 175, ¶130.01 [1].

I 30.02[5].

Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188 (Ct. Cl.
1954).

51

I.R.C.

§ 1031(d); see id. § 1223(1) (tacking the holding period of the property

relinquished onto the holding period of the property received for the

purposes of the characterization of capital gains and capital losses).
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relinquished painting, minus $10,000 cash received plus $10,000
gain recognized).
The requirements for non-recognition treatment under I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1)
include: (1) the holding purpose of the property relinquished and the property
received must be for use in a trade or business or for investment; (2) an
"exchange" of property; and (3) the properties exchanged must be of "like
kind."542 First, the property transferred must have been "held" and the property
received must be "held" by the taxpayer for productive use in a trade or business
or for investment.543 The holding purpose of the taxpayer is based upon the
intention of the taxpayer at the time of the exchange. 5" Thus, if holding purpose
of art relinquished or received is personal pleasure, the exchange will not qualify
for non-recognition under I.R.C. § 1031.54 Similarly, for art dealers and artists in
the business of creating art for sale, 6 I.R.C. § 1031 is unavailable because
inventory and "property held primarily for sale" are expressly excluded from
non-recognition treatment.547

5
5

54

54

Id. § 1031(a)(1).
Id. Property held for productive use in a trade or business may be exchanged
for like-kind property to be held for investment, and vice versa. Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(a)-1(a). In two cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
exchange qualified under I.R.C. § 1031 despite the fact that the ownership by
the taxpayer of the property involved in the exchange was only transitory
because the taxpayer did not intend to liquidate the investment in the
relinquished property or use the replacement property for personal
purposes. Magneson v. Comm'r, 753 F.2d 1490, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1985), a/f'g
81 T.C. 767 (1983); Bolker v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g
81 T.C. 782 (1983).
Wagensen v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 653, 660 (1980); Click v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 225,
231 (1982). Nevertheless, the holding purpose requirement of I.R.C. §
1031(a)(1) may be satisfied even though, at the time of the exchange, the
taxpayer intended to gratuitously transfer the replacement property at a
future date. Wagensen, 74 T.C. 653 at 659 (1980).
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
Alan L. Feld, Artists, Art Collectors and Income Tax, 60 B. U. REV. 625, 647-49
(1980) (arguing, even though an artist holds self-created work as an
investment, I.R.C. § 1031 does not apply as the untaxed element does not
represent capital appreciation but rather personal services).

-

I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(A). The Tax Court held that the language "property held
primarily for sale" under I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(A) is broader than the language
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Second, the type of disposition must qualify as an exchange.># An
exchange of property occurs only if the property exchanged differs materially in
kind or extent"'9 and the transfers are reciprocal and mutually dependent.50 The
actual or constructive receipt of cash by the taxpayer as the consideration for the
property relinquished will prevent I.R.C. § 1031 from applying to the
transaction.55' Although cash may be present to adjust for the differences in the
value of the properties, 552 I.R.C. § 1031 will not apply to a sale of property for
cash even if the proceeds are reinvested in property of like kind,69' and both the
sale and reinvestment occur on the same day.5 54 But if the transaction is, in

substance, an exchange rather than a sale or purchase, the transaction will be
treated as an exchange for the purposes of I.R.C. § 1031.555

parties.

I.R.C. § 1031 also applies to more complex exchanges involving multiple
With numerous variations, a multi-party exchange involves the

56

"held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade or business" under I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1). Neal T. Baker Enters., Inc.
v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1998-302. See supra text accompanying notes 370-74
(examining the language "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary courses of his trade or business" under I.R.C. §
1221(a)(1)).

§ 1031(a)(1).

s4

I.R.C.

549

Treas. Reg.

5

-1
552

§ 1.1001-1(a).

Id. § 1.1002-1(d); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 657 (5th
Cir. 1968).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir.
1967).
Bloomington Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 14, 16 (7th Cir.
1951).

11

Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1981).

55

Carlton, 385 F.2d 238 at 242.

5

Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(f)(1); Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395. For example,
with the application of the substance over form and step transaction
doctrines, the sale of old equipment and the purchase of new equipment
from the same dealer were reciprocal and mutually dependent, therefore, an
exchange of property.

56

McDANIEL ET. AL., supra note 21, at 935; see generally Bradley T. Borden, TaxFree Exchanges of Art and Other Collectibles, 29 J. TAX'N INV. 3, 14 (2012)
(presenting alternative structures for art exchanges that fall within the
qualified intermediary safe harbor).
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exchange of property by the taxpayer, who is seeking non-recognition, with a
party facilitating the exchange, who purchased the replacement property for
cash. 57 Generally, multiple-party exchanges qualify for non-recognition as long
as the taxpayer intends to and does receive like-kind property.SS With regard to
a multiple-party exchange, the actual or constructive receipt of cash by the
taxpayer or taxpayer's agent will prevent I.R.C. § 1031 from applying to the
transaction. 559
Example: Taxpayer is an investor in art, and Buyer wanted to
acquire a painting owned by Taxpayer. As the painting had
substantially appreciated in value, Taxpayer preferred an
exchange but Buyer did not own a painting that Taxpayer
wanted to acquire. To facilitate the exchange, Buyer placed cash
in an amount equal to the value of Taxpayer's painting in an
escrow account to which Taxpayer did not have access. The
escrow agreement provided that Buyer would acquire a painting
selected by Taxpayer with the escrowed cash and then Taxpayer
and Buyer would exchange paintings. If Taxpayer failed to
identify a replacement painting, the sale of Taxpayer's painting
to Buyer would take place. Two months after the escrowed
account was opened, Buyer acquired a painting selected by
Taxpayer and Taxpayer and Buyer exchanged paintings.
Pursuant to I.R.C. section 1031, Taxpayer will not recognized the
gain realized on the exchange of the painting.
Originally, cases and revenue rulings only sanctioned two-party or
multi-party exchanges involving the simultaneous exchange of property.560 But
deferred exchanges of like-kind property received judicial approval in Starker v.
United States.561 In Starker, the taxpayer transferred real property to Crown

5

MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note

21, at 935. Title to the replacement property may

be deeded directly to the exchange party. Treas. Reg.

§ 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4)(iv),

(v).
"
519

Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304; Alderson v. Comm'r, 317 F.2d 790, 795 (9th
Cir. 1963).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(f). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1031(b)-2, 1.1031(k)-1(g)
(providing for safe harbors for the use of qualified intermediaries in multiparty exchanges).

560

BITrKER ET AL., supra note 175,

561

Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979).

130.02[4] [a].
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Zellerbach, a publicly held corporation, for an "exchange balance" of
$1.5 million.5 62 Within a five-year period, Crown Zellerbach was to use the
exchange balance to acquire replacement real property as identified by the
taxpayer or pay any outstanding balance in cash. 63 The Ninth Circuit held that
the transaction qualified under I.R.C. § 1031 on a showing that the taxpayer
preferred replacement property to cash and only like-kind property was
ultimately received.>6
In 1984, Congress responded to Starker by enacting I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3),6
which limits the time period for the identification and receipt of the replacement
property in a deferred exchange.566 For the exchange to qualify, the replacement
property must be identified within 45 days of the date on which the relinquished
property was transferred (identification period).567 Additionally, the replacement
property must be received no later than 180 days after the date of the transfer of
relinquished property or, if earlier, the due date, including extensions, for the tax
return for the tax year in which relinquished property was transferred (exchange
period). 568 Again, the taxpayer may not be in actual or constructive receipt of
cash. 569

562

Id. at 1343.

%3

Id.

6

Id. at 1355.

m

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).

6
M

§ 1031 (a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-i.
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b), (c) (The exchange party
I.R.C.

may identify: (1) three replacement properties of any value (3-property rule);
(2) any number of replacement properties that, in the aggregate, do not
exceed twice the value of the property relinquished (200% rule); and (3) any
replacement property identified before the end of the identification period
and received before the end of the exchange period if 95% of the value of the
identified property is received before the end of the exchange period (95%
rule). Any replacement property received by the exchange party before the
end of the identification period qualifies).
2"8
5

§ 1031(a)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b), (d).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(a), (f); Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355
I.R.C.

(9th Cir. 1979). The Treasury Regulations provide safe harbors that allow the
exchange party to secure or guarantee the receipt of the replacement
property without the actual or constructive receipt of cash: (1) security or
guarantee arrangements; (2) qualified escrow accounts and qualified trusts;
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Example: Assume in the example above, Taxpayer transferred
the painting to Buyer on January 1 of the current tax year. Buyer
placed cash in an amount equal to the value of the painting
relinquished by Taxpayer in an escrow account to which
Taxpayer did not have access. Under the escrow agreement, the
Buyer was to acquire a painting selected by Taxpayer with the
escrowed cash. If at any time Buyer failed to perform, Taxpayer
could demand the escrowed cash. On February 15, Taxpayer
identified the replacement painting and, on March 31, Buyer
acquired the replacement painting and transferred the painting
to Taxpayer. Pursuant to I.R.C. section 1031, Taxpayer will not
recognized the gain realized on the exchange of the painting.
Third, for the application of I.R.C. § 1031 to an exchange, the
relinquished property and the replacement property must be of like kind.5 The
term "like kind" refers to the "nature or character of the property and not to its
grade or quality. One kind or class of property may not .. . be exchanged for
property of a different kind or class."57' Although the Treasury Regulations do
not define kind or class, examples provide insight as to the distinction between
kind or class and grade or quality. 572 The Treasury Regulations establish a broad
definition of like kind with regard to real property by stating the fact that real
property is improved or unimproved relates only to the grade or quality of the
property and not its kind or class.57 3 The examples include the exchange of city
real property for a ranch or farm and the exchange of a 30-year leasehold in real
property for a fee interest in real property. 74
By contrast, the examples involving the exchange of personal property
are much narrower in scope: a used truck for a new truck and a used passenger
and (3) qualified intermediaries. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1355. An interest or
growth factor will not result in a determination that the exchange party is in
actual or constructive receipt of cash. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)).
570
57

§ 1031(a)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b). See generally Borden, supra note 556, at 6
I.R.C.

(providing a detailed analysis of the terms "like kind" and "like class" as
applicable to works of art).
572

Borden, supra note 556, at 6.

-7

Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b).

s7

Id. § 1.1031(a)-1(c). Real property located within the U.S. is not like real
property located outside the U.S. I.R.C § 1031(h)(1).

Taxation of Artists & the Acquirers of Art

2015

151

automobile for a new passenger automobile.575 Fortunately, the Treasury
Regulations provide safe harbors for the exchange of depreciable tangible
personal property. 7 6 Under the Treasury Regulations, the like-kind requirement
is satisfied if depreciable tangible personal property is in the same "General
Asset Class" or the same "Product Class." 77 If the personal property is nondepreciable or intangible, the like-kind requirement is satisfied based on all the
facts and circumstances' The Treasury Regulations state that whether
intangible personal property is like kind depends on the nature and character of
the rights involved, for example, a patent or a copyright, and the nature and
character of the underlying property to which the intangible property relates. 57 9
The two examples are provided in the Treasury Regulations: a copyright on a
novel is of like kind to a copyright on a different novel, and a copyright on a
novel is not of like kind to a copyright on a song.sso
If objects of art are exchanged, a series of revenue rulings involving the
exchange of coins and bullion provide an understanding as to what constitutes
like-kind property.581 The exchange of U.S. $20 gold coins for South African
Krugerrand gold coins, both held for investment purposes, was found not to be
an exchange of like-kind property because the U.S. $20 gold coins are
numismatic-type coins while the South African Krugerrand coins are bulliontype coins.582 Although both contain gold, the underlying investment was
entirely different because the bullion-type coins, unlike the numismatic-type
coins, represent an investment in gold on the world market rather than an

-7

576

sn

Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c). Personal property used predominantly within
the U.S. is not like kind with property used predominantly outside the U.S.
I.R.C. § 1031(h)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(a).
Id. § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(1). Revenue Procedure 87-56 establishes an asset class for
office furniture, which "includes such assets as desks, files, safes, and
communication equipment." Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, §5.11, modified
and clarified by Rev. Proc. 88-22, 1988-1C.B. 785. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)2(b)(2) (explaining general asset classes). See also id. § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(3), (4)
(explaining product classes).

578

Id. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(1).

s7

Id.

580

Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3).

581

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B. 264.

582

Id.
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In determining whether the coins were like
investment in the coins themselves.
kind, the Secretary of the Treasury relied on the legislative history of I.R.C. §
1031(e), which provides that livestock of different sexes are not like kind.584 The
committee report points out that the different sexes of livestock represent
different types of investment, in one case for breeding and in the other case for
slaughter.585
In a later revenue ruling, an investor purchased gold bullion and
subsequently exchanged the gold bullion for Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins. 586
Although the Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins are legal tender, the coins were
not a circulating medium of exchange as the gold content of the coins greatly
exceeded the face amount.587 Because the Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins are
bought and sold for their gold content, the gold bullion and the Canadian Maple
Leaf gold coins are like-kind property.5 8 But the exchange of gold bullion held
for investment for silver bullion held for investment was found not to qualify as
an exchange of like-kind property.589 Despite the fact that the metals have some
similar qualities and uses and the value of the metals are determined solely on
the basis of their metal content, silver and gold are intrinsically different metals
and are primarily used in different ways.S" Silver is essentially an industrial
commodity and gold is primarily utilized as an investment in itself.591
Similarly, in California Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner,592 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in holding that the exchange of Swiss francs
for U.S. Double Eagle $20 gold coins was not an exchange of like-kind
property.59' The U.S. Double Eagle gold coins are exchanged in the marketplace
only by numismatists and are valued primarily for their rarity as collector items
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5 Id.
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58

Id.

5M

Id.

-

Rev. Rul. 82-166, 1982-2 C.B.190.
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93

Id. at 87.

Taxation of Artists & the Acquirers of Art

2015

153

whereas Swiss francs are circulating currency and represent investments in the
Swiss national economy. 59 4 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Tax Court
did not err in refusing to apply the lenient treatment of real estate exchanges to
the exchanges of personal property. 595 Again, the legislative history of I.R.C.
§ 1031(e) was relied on in interpreting whether the coins involved in the
exchange are like kind; in enacting I.R.C. § 1031(e), which provides that livestock
of different sexes are not like-kind property, Congress "suggested" that personal
property is to be accorded different treatment from real property. 596 "The
legislative history of that amendment indicates that its proponents viewed it as
declaration of Congress' original intent in passing § 1031 and intended it to
overcome too lenient interpretations of the 'like kind' requirement."597
Finally, Private Letter Ruling ("PLR") 8127089,598 which offers guidance
as to what constitutes property similar or related in service or used for the
purposes of I.R.C.

§

1033,599 offers guidance as to what constitutes like-kind

property for the purposes of I.R.C. § 1031. The letter discussed an art collection
consisting almost entirely of lithographs, as well as some works of art in other
artistic media was damaged by fire.6w The Secretary of the Treasury rejected the
taxpayer's proposal to replace the lithographs and the works of art in other
artistic media with a greater percentage of art in other artistic media, such as oil
paintings, watercolors, sculptures, or other graphic forms of art.60 1 The Secretary
of the Treasury concluded art in one medium was not similar or related in
service or use with art in another medium.602 Further, in responding to the
victims of Hurricane Andrew,603 noting PLR 8127089,604 the Secretary of the
59
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Treasury concluded that the use of different types of paint, for example, acrylic
versus oil, generally will not cause two paintings held for investment to fail the
similar or related in service or use requirement of I.R.C. § 1033.60
IV.

CONCLUSION

The federal income tax treatment of individuals involved in the art
world varies dramatically as the individual moves along the spectrum from an
artist or collector who is a hobbyist, to an investor who holds art for appreciation
in value, and, finally, to an artist or art dealer who creates or acquires art for sale.
With each category, the determination of which tax provisions apply and how
tax provisions apply is often unclear or unresolved, with the Secretary of the
Treasury providing little, if any, guidance. Nevertheless, the initial classification
of the individual is often the most difficult determination. The cases are
numerous, and the distinctions are highly factual. Unfortunately, the tax
treatment of creating, purchasing, and selling art, which is more than the pursuit
of captured emotion but a multi-billion dollar industry, has not received the
necessary attention. As a result, the taxpayer and the tax advisor are faced with
too many grey areas of the tax law in planning for the art lover.
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